General Epistemology

(with Melis, Giacomo). Forthcoming. ‘Williamsonian Scepticism about the A Priori’. In Beyond Sense? New Essays on the Significance, Grounds, and Extent of the A Priori, edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini. Oxford University Press. [.pdf]

2024. ‘Responses to Commentators: Berinstein, Kovach, McDowell, Neta, Sethi, Smithies’. In Empirical Reason and Sensory Experience, edited by Miloš Vuletić and Ori Beck. Springer International Publishing. [.pdf]

2024. ‘Perceptual Justification—Two Conceptions Compared’. In Empirical Reason and Sensory Experience, edited by Miloš Vuletić and Ori Beck. Springer International Publishing. [.pdf]

(with Coliva, Annalisa and Gupta, Anil). 2024. ‘A Debate on Skepticism and Perceptual Belief’. In Empirical Reason and Sensory Experience, edited by Miloš Vuletić and Ori Beck. Springer International Publishing. [.pdf]

(with Moretti, Luca). 2023. ‘Epistemic Entitlement, Epistemic Risk and Leaching’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3): 566–80. [.pdf]

(with Thorpe, Joshua). 2022. ‘Putnam’s Proof Revisited’. In Engaging Putnam, edited by James Conant and Sanjit Chakraborty. De Gruyter. [.pdf]

2018. ‘Facts and Certainty’. In Skepticism: Historical and Contemporary Inquiries, edited by Anthony Bruno and Abby Rutherford. Routledge. (reprint with a new introduction and retrospect) [.pdf]

2018. ‘Counter-Conceivability Again’. In Being Necessary: Themes of Ontology and Modality from the Work of Bob Hale, edited by Ivette Fred-Rivera and Jessica Leech. Oxford University Press. [.pdf]

2014. ‘On Epistemic Entitlement (II): Welfare State Epistemology’. In Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini. Oxford University Press. [.pdf]

2012. ‘Warrant Transmission and Entitlement’. In Mind, Meaning and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, edited by Annalisa Coliva. Oxford University Press. (part IV of ‘Replies’) [.pdf]

2011. ‘McKinsey One More Time’. In Self-Knowledge, edited by Anthony Hatzimoysis. Oxford University Press. [.pdf]

2011. ‘Frictional Coherentism? A Comment on Chapter 10 of Ernest Sosa’s Reflective Knowledge’. Philosophical Studies 153 (1): 29-41. [.pdf]

2008. ‘Internal—External: Doxastic Norms and the Defusing of Sceptical Paradox’. Special number on Epistemic Norms, Journal of Philosophy 105 (9): 501-17. [.pdf]

2008. ‘Comment on John McDowell’s ‘The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument”. In Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, edited by Adrian Haddock and Fiona MacPherson. Oxford University Press. [.pdf]

2007. ‘The Perils of Dogmatism’. In Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, edited by Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay. Oxford University Press. [.pdf]

2004. ‘Hinge Propositions and the Serenity Prayer’. In Knowledge and Belief: Papers of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium, edited by Winfried Löffler and Paul Weingartner. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. [.pdf]

2004. ‘Warrant for Nothing: On Epistemic Entitlement’. Supplement, Aristotelian Society 78: 167-212 [.pdf]

2004. ‘Scepticism, Certainty, Moore and Wittgenstein’. In Wittgenstein’s Lasting Significance, edited by Max Kölbel and Bernhard Weiss. Routledge. [.pdf]

2004. ‘Wittgensteinian Certainties’. In Wittgenstein and Scepticism, edited by in Denis McManus. Routledge. [.pdf]

2003. ‘Some Reflections on the Acquisition of Warrant by Inference’. In New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, edited by Susana Nuccetelli. MIT Press. [.pdf]

2002. ‘(Anti)-Sceptics, Simple and Subtle: G.E Moore and John McDowell’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65: 330-48. [.pdf]

2000. ‘Replies’. Philosophical Issues 10: 201-19. [.pdf]

2000. ‘Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey’s Paradox and Putnam’s Proof’. Philosophical Issues 10: 140-63. [.pdf]

1998. ‘McDowell’s Oscillation’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2): 395-402. (contribution to a book symposium on John McDowell’s Mind and World) [.pdf]

1996. ‘Human Nature?’. European Journal of Philosophy 4: 235-54. (reprinted with a new postscript in Smith, Nicholas, ed. 2002. Reading McDowell: On Mind and World. Routledge.) [.pdf]

1994. ‘On Putnam’s Proof that we are not Brains-in-a-Vat’. In Reading Putnam, edited by Peter Clark and Bob Hale. Wiley-Blackwell. (extended version) [.pdf]

1991. ‘On Putnam’s Proof that we are not Brains-in-a-Vat’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92, 67-94. [.pdf]

1991. ‘Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon’. Mind 100: 87-116. [.pdf]

1985. ‘Facts and Certainty’. Proceedings of the British Academy 71: 429- 72. (Henriette Hertz Philosophical Lecture for the British Academy, December 1985; reprinted in Baldwin, Thomas and Smiley, Timothy, eds. 2004. Studies in the Philosophy of Logic and Knowledge. Oxford University Press.; also reprinted in Bruno, Anthony and Rutherford, Abby, eds. 2018. Skepticism: Historical and Contemporary Inquiries. Routledge. see above)

1984. ‘Comment on Lowe’. Analysis 44: 183-5. [.pdf]

1983. ‘Keeping Track of Nozick’. Analysis 43: 134-40. [.pdf]