

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Alethic pluralism, deflationism, and faultless disagreement

Crispin Wright^{1, 2}

¹Department of Philosophy, New York University, New York, USA

²Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, United Kingdom

Correspondence

Crispin Wright, Department of Philosophy, New York University, 5 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003, USA.

Email: cw43@nyu.edu

Abstract

One of the most important “folk” anti-realist thoughts about certain areas of our thought and discourse—basic taste, for instance, or comedy—is that their lack of objectivity crystallises in the possibility of “faultless disagreements”: situations where one party accepts *P*, another rejects *P*, and neither is guilty of any kind of mistake of substance or shortcoming of cognitive process. On close inspection, however, it proves challenging to make coherent sense of this idea, and a majority of theorists have come to reject it as incoherent. There are two significant exceptions in the contemporary literature: relativists often hold it up as something of a coup for their view that it can make straightforward sense of faultless disagreement; and the author of this paper has argued (Wright 2006) that making judicious intuitionistic revisions to classical logic can provide resources that suffice to stabilise the notion. The present paper argues that neither relativism nor intuitionism in fact provides a satisfactory account and indicates how an alethic pluralist framework enables us to do better.

KEYWORDS

faultless disagreement, relativism, the simple deduction, intuitionism, alethic pluralism, deflationism

1 | FAULTLESS DISAGREEMENT AND THE FOLK VIEW

Suppose you and I are agreed that we should leave a 12 percent tip for the Italian dinner we have just shared but then, when the bill arrives, disagree about what amount that comes to. Then, if we have each done the calculation in our heads, one at least of us must have made a mistake; and if we did it on our phones, then at least one of us messed up the keypad process or used a faulty phone. Those are examples of *cognitive-procedural fault*. Other examples, more generally, are any case of forming an opinion about something by way of reliance on (in context) defective evidence, or mis-assessment of the evidence one has, or reliance upon defective perceptual faculties or on an unreliable memory.

Notice that cognitive-procedural fault need not involve getting the answer to the matter at issue wrong; one can get lucky. Mr. Magoo may be right in believing that there is no on-coming traffic right now, although he cannot see the crossing at all clearly; I may be coincidentally right that the kettle whistle is sounding although what I am actually responding to is the abrupt onset of an episode of tinnitus. You may make two mistakes in your calculation, one cancelling the other out. By contrast, while at least one of us must have fallen into cognitive-procedural fault concerning what is 12 percent of our restaurant bill, one or both of us must also be in *alethic fault*: getting the answer wrong. And just as one can, luckily, go via a cognitive-procedurally faulty process to a true opinion about something, so one may, unluckily (in general, though not when an effectively decidable matter is concerned, as in the restaurant bill case), go via a route involving no cognitive-procedural fault to a false opinion. So much is platitudinous.

A faultless disagreement, for our purposes here, is to be understood as a disagreement in which none of the disagreeing parties is *either* cognitive-procedurally *or* alethically at fault. So far as I have been able to tell, the term “faultless disagreement,” now standard in the debates, first occurs in print in Kölbel, where he writes as follows:

A faultless disagreement is a situation where there is a thinker *A*, a thinker *B*, and a proposition (content of judgement) *p*, such that:

- a. *A* believes (judges) that *p* and *B* believes (judges) that not-*p*
- b. Neither *A* nor *B* has made a mistake (is at fault).

I believe that most people have a healthy pre-theoretical intuition that there can be and are faultless disagreements in this sense. (2004, 53–54)

Does this idea really make sense, however? The idea that it does is, I think, entrenched in folk-philosophical thought about some of our most basic values—notably values of culinary taste, comedy, and some values of social propriety, aesthetics, and (for some folk thinkers) ethics. The value judgements concerned are cases where we feel parties can genuinely disagree—that is, affirm mutually incompatible opinions—without anyone having come to their particular view via some cognitive-procedurally objectionable route or being mistaken about the matter at hand. “On this question,” we say, “your opinion is as good as mine.” “Everyone is entitled to her opinion.” And when we say this kind of thing about the values concerned, we don’t mean that the facts of the matter are unknown, so that everybody can do no better than shoot in the dark. We don’t mean that your *guess* is as good as mine. Rather, ordinary thought has it that in such cases, there is “no

fact of the matter” to make a mistaken guess about. So, anyway, as it seems to me, the sociological fact is.¹

Call this kind of thinking the *Folk View* of (some) basic evaluations.² I am not here going to try to elaborate on how far into the varieties of value this kind of ur-anti-realist thinking extends; nor how far it ought to extend. My question is whether it makes sense at all, and if so, what kind of framework is needed, or able, to safeguard its coherence.

2 | THE SIMPLE DEDUCTION

Some people find sushi delicious. Others are repelled by the characteristic odour of raw fish and find sushi highly disagreeable. The proposition (P) that sushi is delicious is a good example, if anything is a good example, of the kind of evaluation that is apt to give rise to faultless disagreements of the kind sanctioned by the Folk View.

On the face of it, however, the Folk View is indeed incoherent. That it is so may be brought out by the following Simple Deduction.³

Suppose you and I disagree about P, you endorsing and I denying it. Then,

1	(1) You accept that P is true	—	Assumption
2	(2) I deny that P is true	—	Assumption
3	(3) Our disagreement is faultless, so involves no mistake on either side	—	Assumption for reductio ad absurdum
4	(4) P is true	—	Assumption
2, 4	(5) I am mistaken	—	2, 4
2, 3	(6) Not: P is true	—	4, 5, 3 Reductio
1, 2, 3	(7) You are mistaken	—	1, 6
1,2,	(8) Not (3)	—	3, 3, 7 Reductio

Note that the argument makes no appeal to Bivalence. It does not tacitly assume that there is a “fact of the matter” as to whether or not sushi is delicious. The argument formally requires only the existence of a proposition, P, that is (i) truth apt, (ii) suitable to feature in contexts of propositional attitude, (iii) available for supposition and negation, and (iv) subject to the basic inferential properties of negation. If it is cogent, our disagreement about sushi cannot be faultless—the conjoint suppositions of (1), (2), and (3) are inconsistent.

One reaction is that the argument shows that there can indeed be no faultless disagreement about a single such proposition as P—either that our apparent disagreement has no proper propositional content at all, as an expressivist response might suggest, or that it has no *unique* propositional focus—that, as a contextualist response will suggest, our divergent tastes have the effect that we mean non-conflicting propositions by our respective uses of “sushi is

¹To stress, I do not mean to claim that the “Folk View” is universal or even predominant among the folk! There is undoubtedly a strong undercurrent towards moral objectivism in ordinary thought, as evidenced by, for instance, the work of the moral psychologists Goodwin and Darley (2008; 2009; 2012). Jeremy Wyatt (2018) references a considerable body of empirical work attesting to a similar trend in matters of taste.

²I am making no distinction here from what I earlier (Wright 2006) called “the Ordinary View.”

³The Simple Deduction is a central focus of Wright 2001. Compare Kölbel 2004, 56. The reasoning was originally offered by Shapiro and Taschek (1996) as a problem for the coherence of the idea of failure of Cognitive Command, in the sense of Wright 1992, 92–93).

delicious.” Both these tendencies are of course well represented in the literature.⁴ We shall not pursue either here.

Our project in what follows is, rather, to outline a way of making sense of faultless disagreement which goes in neither of these directions but conserves the appearance that your and my disagreement about sushi is indeed targeted upon a single truth-evaluable proposition. So we must eventually find some way to draw the sting of the Simple Deduction.

3 | THE CONSTRAINTS ON THE PROJECT

In accordance with what has already been said, a successful execution of the project has to be subject to the following two constraints:

Contradiction: In the case of a dispute of the kind we are concerned with, the two antagonists have to be represented as respectively committed to affirming and to denying a single proposition; their opinions must be contentually inconsistent with each other.

Faultlessness: Neither antagonist need be guilty of any cognitive-procedural or alethic shortcoming.

In previous work (Wright 2006) I have suggested that a third constraint is mandated by the Folk View:

Sustainability: Neither antagonist need rationally suffer any diminution of confidence in his or her respective view based purely on the antagonists finding themselves in disagreement—faultless disagreements are to be examples where, in the terminology of the peer disagreement literature, *steadfastness* can be an appropriate response.

One comment. Sustainability should not seem controversial in this context. Even if we regard each other as epistemic peers, it is evident that if our disagreement is genuinely faultless on both sides, then of course neither of us should be disturbed by the fact that a presumed epistemic peer takes a different view of the matter at hand. Our doing so has no bearing on the likelihood of one's own view being in any way defective.

4 | RELATIVISM

Anyone who has any kind of lurking Protagorean sympathies is likely to think that the areas of thought and discourse where the possibility of faultless disagreement may intuitively seem real are exactly those where we should take seriously some form of relativism about truth. Of course, there are a variety of kinds of alethic relativism to be found in the recent literature. But what may seem to be exactly what is needed to underwrite the Folk View is the generic structural thought that for certain subject matters truth is a ternary relation: there is no absolute truth, only “your truth” or “my truth” or truth according to such and such standards, or perspective, or truth at a time . . .

⁴See López de Sa 2008 for one contextualist account. An important book-length contextualist treatment is Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009. It is critiqued in Ferrari and Wright 2017. For a review of the prospects for an expressivist account of judgements of taste, see Eriksson 2016. See also Huvenes 2012.

The recent debates about relativism are ramified and complex.⁵ The question whether relativism can help with the present project needs some discussion in detail, but I think the dust has settled sufficiently to enable us to see that neither of two broad kinds of relativist idea offers any help. In brief, one fails to explain how the sushi disagreement can be faultless, while the other represents the case as involving nothing that should count as a genuine disagreement.

Thus MacFarlane-style *assessor-sensitivity* suggests that, for certain areas of discourse, the truth of a judgement should be relativised to the context (standards, perspective, location, time, and so on) of an assessor of it and can therefore vary in tandem with variation in who is assessing it. Who is to be the assessor in the case of our dispute about sushi? If it is you, you will rightly judge that my view is false. If it is I, my judgement of your view will be the same. For each of us, then, the other is in error, and thereby alethically faulty. No progress.

There has not always been clarity about this point, but Mark Richard, for one, is commendably clear about it. He writes,

Suppose I think that Beaufort is a better cheese than Tome, and you think the reverse. Suppose (for *reductio*) that each of our thoughts is valid—mine is true from my perspective, yours is from yours. Then not only can I (validly) say that Beaufort is better than Tome, I can (validly) say that it's true that Beaufort is better than Tome. And of course if you think Tome is better than Beaufort and not vice versa I can also (validly) say that you think that it's not the case that Beaufort is better than Tome. So I can (validly) say that it's true that Beaufort is better than Tome though you think Beaufort isn't better than Tome. From which it surely follows that you're mistaken—after all, if you have a false belief, you are mistaken about something. This line of reasoning is sound no matter what the object of dispute. (2008, 132)

Another who is clear-headed on the matter is Paul Boghossian, who, citing the above passage from Richard with approval, glosses the central thought as:

Just because p is at best relatively true, and just because it is true from my perspective and false from yours, it is not *therefore* right to say that our disagreement is faultless. For even if all of this is true, it will still be true that if I validly (that is, truly, relative to my perspective) judge that p, then it will also be valid for me to judge that 'It is true that p' and also 'It is false that Not p.' And if I can validly judge that 'It is false that Not p' then I must regard anyone who believes that Not p to have made a mistake. (2011, 62)

Suppose we go instead for *author sensitivity*.⁶ We relativise the truth-value of P, then, not to the context of an assessor of it but to the context of the author of a judgement whether P (or more generally, of a judgement in which P is embedded). Suppose you are the author of a judgement that sushi is delicious. Then I am obliged, other things being equal, to regard your judgement as true, even though I hold a contrary view, which I also judge to be true. So, by adjunction, I have to judge

⁵ John MacFarlane's magisterial *Assessment Sensitivity* (2014), encompassing chapters covering the ground of many of his earlier papers, bestrides all the debates and specific areas of application of relativist semantics recently proposed. But relativism about epistemic modals has been defended, in addition, in Egan, Hawthorne, and Weatherson 2004, Egan 2007 and 2011, and Gillies 2010. Among the advocates of relativism about "knows" are Brogaard (2008), Kompa (2002), Richard (2004), and Stephenson (2007). Advocates of relativism about predicates of taste include Egan (2010), Lasersohn (2005), Kölbel (2004), and Richard (2008). Relativism about indicative conditionals is sympathetically discussed by Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010) and Weatherson (2009). Relativism about probability statements has been proposed by Douven (2011) and discussed by Yu (2016); a relativistic treatment of future contingents has been discussed by Belnap, Perloff, and Xu (2001).

⁶ A preferable moniker, surely, to MacFarlane's opaque "Non-indexical Contextualism" (2014, chap. 4, sec. 6).

as true this proposition: that you truly judge that sushi is delicious, while it is not the case that sushi is delicious.

That seems like an arrant conceptual solecism, but maybe hardened Protagoreans will take it in stride. The real objection in the present context to this second form of relativistic approach to faultless disagreement is that, while we are indeed affirming contradictory propositions—that is, propositions that no single subject can consistently endorse simultaneously—there is no cause, on this stripe of relativism, to regard us as *disagreeing*. I do not disagree with you if, although the proposition that you affirm is inconsistent with something I affirm, there is, in my context, a truth-conditional equivalent of what you affirm which I *can* consistently affirm alongside my own view. And there is: your affirmation of P has the same truth conditions as, in my mouth, the proposition that P has in your context. We no more disagree than if, in New York, I affirm that the weather is stiflingly hot while you, in Scotland, affirm at the same time that the weather is cool and unsettled.

It transpires, then, that the mutual contradictoriness of our opinions does not, once author sensitivity is in the field, ensure that we are in genuine disagreement. We need to be clear that the relevant constraint on an account of faultless disagreement is that it preserve *Genuine Disagreement*. A (two-party) disagreement is genuine, I propose, if and only if, either protagonist, if rational, will regard reason to regard his antagonist as judging correctly as reason to regard himself as mistaken. Author-sensitive relativism cannot secure Genuine Disagreement in this sense. Contradiction suffices for Genuine Disagreement if and only if relativism is eschewed.

5 | AN INTUITIONISTIC RESPONSE: THE PARITY CONSTRAINT

If relativism doesn't help, what else might help?

In previous work (Wright 2001 and 2006), I canvassed the suggestion that a broadly *intuitionist* framework can conserve what might be regarded as the most important element in the Folk View, namely, that in such a dispute there need be no presumption that either disputant *in particular* need be at fault, either cognitive procedurally, in the manner in which the disputants arrive at their respective views, or alethically, in their misrepresenting the facts. An intuitionistic account will acknowledge that your and my respective views about sushi cannot both be true: that much is just a consequence of their mutual inconsistency. But when Bivalence, and associatedly the law of excluded middle, fail for broadly intuitionistic reasons, that consideration does not force us to say that one in particular of us has to be at fault.

What this comes to is, in effect, the suggestion that the Simple Deduction is perfectly acceptable, as far as it goes, but that we are prone to overinterpret its conclusion. The reasoning seems unacceptable only because, with our usual classical-logical instincts, we implicitly pass from its actual conclusion, which is in effect the negation of a conjunction of negated propositions, to the affirmation of the disjunction of those propositions. The appearance of aporia tacitly involves this extra step. Let A = I am mistaken, and B = you are mistaken. Then the extra step is an application of the De Morgan inference:

Not (Not A & Not B)

A V B

whose conclusion will indeed commit us to the, as it were, distributive thought that either you are mistaken about sushi or I am, and its unwelcome implication that the metaphysics of taste sustains a “fact of the matter.” Save, however, for instances of A and of B for which Bivalence is acceptable, the extra step is intuitionistically invalid. So if we can motivate intuitionistic

distinctions for a logic appropriate to judgements of taste, we shall have every prospect of the resources to accept that you and I disagree about sushi—that our opinions about it compose a Genuine Disagreement—without being forced to think that one of us in particular has to be mistaken.

That is to satisfy Genuine Disagreement and (an interpretation of) Faultlessness—you and I cannot both be right, admittedly, but there is no reason to think that one in particular of us has to be at fault. The intuitionistic proposal can also appropriate the attractive motivation for Sustainability, outlined above. Once there is no presumption that one or the other disputant in particular has to be guilty of cognitive-procedural or alethic shortcoming—no presumption that distributively, as it were, either you are at fault or I am—then there is no rational pressure on us individually to think, “... and *the guilty party* could as well be me,” so no pressure to qualify or abandon our respective views. So there is a *prima facie* case that the intuitionistic proposal, if it can be otherwise well motivated, can capture (something of) each of the three noted desiderata gestured at by the Folk View: the disagreement in the sushi case can be genuine, yet there is no justified presumption that either antagonist in particular has to be at fault, and no extant reason for either protagonist not to persist, even in the face of an opposing, no less appropriately generated view.⁷

There is a serious objection, however. If my opinion is genuinely incompatible with yours, am not *I* at least committed to regarding you as mistaken (and you, me)? Maybe there is no pressure, flowing from a misguided acceptance a priori of the principle of bivalence for the kind of judgement concerned, to suppose that one of us in particular *has* to be mistaken. But still, do we not both, just in taking a view, commit ourselves to regarding the other as *de facto* mistaken? In short, it seems that *the disputants themselves* in a disagreement of this kind cannot regard the dispute as faultless, even if, according to the intuitionist treatment bruited, there is no general philosophical pressure, bearing upon a neutral witness, to suppose that there has to be fault in such a dispute. So something important in the Folk View may seem to have been lost. The scope for considered tolerance—part, plausibly, of what was meant to be implicated by “faultlessness” and conveyed in the acknowledgement we are wont to make in such cases that *your opinion is just as good as mine*—has not yet been made available to those actually involved in the disagreement.⁸

Call this fourth requirement *Parity*. In effect, it is the requirement that faultlessness be appreciable, and endorseable, from the point of view not just of neutrals but also of the committed parties in the relevant kind of dispute. The Folk View, when pressed, is—I expect the reader to agree on reflection—that apparent disputes of the kind illustrated by the sushi example should manifest each of Genuine Disagreement, Faultlessness, Sustainability, and Parity. The intuitionistic proposal, it seems, cannot accommodate Parity.

6 | TOWARDS A SOLUTION

But let's go carefully. Our problem now is Parity: in opining that sushi is delicious, you opine that it is false that it is disagreeable, and hence that my opinion is false. So how can you regard that opinion as no worse than your own?

Well, regarding my opinion as false compromises its parity with yours only if “false” carries its *normal normative punch*. It is here that I wish to invoke aspects of the treatment of truth and truth aptitude that I proposed in *Truth and Objectivity* (1992) and “Intuitionism, Realism,

⁷My earlier development of this proposal, and some responses to objections, are offered in Wright 2006, secs. 4 to 6.

⁸Wright 2006 realised this and fell back on a novel form of relativism, involving a relativisation of the truth predicate itself. Unfortunately, this manoeuvre has no prospect of accommodating Genuine Disagreement.

Relativism and Rhubarb” (1998). I have no space here to rehearse the grounds for the two contentions of *Truth and Objectivity* that are most relevant to our present concern, so I must ask readers unfamiliar with my earlier work on truth for a degree of indulgence.

The first contention was that truth evaluability—the aptitude of its signature statements for truth and falsity—is a relatively superficial property of a discourse, conferred (i) by those statements’ amenability to embedding within the conditional, negation, and the other logical operators and within contexts of propositional attitude, and (ii) by the use of such statements—their assertion, denial, retraction—being subject to acknowledged constraints of evidence and context. This thesis is a point of overlap with deflationism about truth, since the stated conditions ensure that a truth predicate will be definable over the statements of the discourse in question satisfying the Disquotational Scheme:

“P” is true if and only if P.

Moreover, I am in agreement with the deflationists that there is not very much to the concept—I stress: *concept*—of truth except what can be elicited from that schema.⁹

Truth and Objectivity parted company with the deflationists, however, in insisting—the second contention—that this minimalist conception of what it takes for the statements of a discourse to be truth apt does not pre-empt the question “What is the nature of truth?” where truth is considered a *property* of certain statements of the discourse. The thin character of the concept does not preclude the substantiality of the property or properties that a statement’s falling under the concept may thereby instantiate. A central contention of *Truth and Objectivity* was that—at least over merely minimally truth-apt discourses—truth need carry no payload of accurate substantial representation. When merely minimally truth-apt claims are at stake, to regard a statement as false need not be to attribute any *representational* fault to someone’s acceptance of it. So if there need be no *other* kind of fault, the way is open for the idea that, in such a case, to describe an opponent’s view as “false” is, in effect, to go no further than to record one’s disagreement with it, with no implication of any further deficiency. There would be an imputation of fault, and hence a compromise of Parity, only when “true” demands some kind of richer interpretation. But where merely minimally truth-apt discourses are concerned, is there any good reason to suppose that this has to be so in general?

A purely deflationary account of truth in general will, of course, answer “No.” For deflationists, truth should either not be thought of as a property (of statements) at all, or—more concessively—should be thought of only as a metaphysically “thin” property, whose nature is fully apparent in the concept of it conveyed by the truth-predicate as it engages minimally truth-apt discourses.¹⁰ It is this second conception of the truth property that I wish to enlist for our present purpose. But I propose we avail ourselves of it not by way of a blanket adoption of deflationism but as one among a *range* of truth properties that, according to the alethic pluralism defended in *Truth and Objectivity*, the concept expressed by “true” may, as we vary the discourse concerned, serve to convey.

The superior resources of the resulting position compared to those fostered by (author) relativism are worth emphasis. It should be clear that on this—as I shall call it—*minimalist* account there is no evident obstacle to the satisfaction of Genuine Disagreement. The relativistic tendency is to try to accommodate Parity by, in effect, one way or another, compatibilising the disputants’ respective views: by construing the kind of truth they enjoy, or the kind of truth-makers that bear on them, as capable of peaceful coexistence, even though the claims

⁹There is arguably a bit more to the concept of truth. For example, the truth of a statement is usually taken to be a timeless property of it.

¹⁰Thinking of it as metaphysically “thin” property will be the preferable approach for anyone sympathetic to an “abundant” view of properties whereby any significant predicate is assured of an associated property.

themselves are overtly contradictory in the sense, once again, that no single thinker can consistently accept both. So author relativism has to hold that if I take you to be making a claim about sushi that genuinely disagrees with mine, I have to misconceive the constraints to which, if you are clear-headed, you intend your claim to answer. Minimalism avoids this bind. No relativised notions of truth now feature. When you affirm the truth of your view, you are not to be interpreted, as author relativism will interpret you, as committed merely to its satisfaction of a truth condition that simply has no role in my assessment and the satisfaction of which I do not dispute. Rather just as, on the surface, it appears you are committed to an appraisal of sushi that I do indeed reject. But, again, your commitment to the truth of your appraisal need involve no imputation of fault to me. You are indeed committed to the falsity of my opinion. But since this is merely minimal falsity, and tagging my opinion as “false” is, where basic taste is concerned, simply another way of expressing your disagreement with it, with no implication of cognitive-procedural or alethic shortcoming on my part, my view can be none the worse for that.¹¹

The suggestion, in summary, is that locally minimal—fully deflated—notions of truth and falsity are available to allow one to describe a contested opinion as *false* without thereby doing more than recording one's disagreement with it, in particular without imputing any kind of cognitive or other shortcoming to its author. “Locally” is of course important. A global deflationist who took this line would have to explain what makes the difference when, in imputing falsity to a view, one precisely *does* intend to impute fault. That does not mean that global deflationism cannot avail itself of the present suggestion. But it does mean that an account of the distinction between disputes that are liable to betoken faultless disagreement and disputes of more substantial matters, where shortcoming of some kind is essentially involved, will have to proceed in other terms. That someone thinks something false, merely, will underdetermine the issue. By contrast, within the alethic pluralist framework of *Truth and Objectivity*, fully deflationary conceptions of truth and falsity can be reserved for the problematic subject matters with which we are currently concerned, without any commitment to so conceiving of truth across the board.¹²

7 | WHAT ABOUT THE INFLATIONARY ARGUMENT OF CHAPTER 1 OF *TRUTH AND OBJECTIVITY*?

There is, though, a fairly immediate snag with the foregoing line, at least for the present author. It is that to invoke the alleged resource of a non-normative truth property is surely in blatant conflict with the Inflationary Argument of chapter 1 of *Truth and Objectivity*. That argument was that deflationism is inherently unstable because even the disquotational scheme implicitly commits us to truth's having some kind of distinctive normative role that contrasts with that of assertibility or warrantability—something that cannot be acknowledged by any theorist for whom the role of the truth predicate is, locally or globally, purely that of a device of endorsement and generalisation.

I have reserved some discussion of this issue to the Appendix below. Here though, let me briefly explain why I believe the Inflationary Argument poses no insuperable obstacle to the project of underwriting the Folk View in the minimalist terms outlined above. The Inflationary Argument proceeded by first reflecting that the Disquotational Scheme itself imposes a certain

¹¹The suggestion that a rescue of the idea of faultless disagreement might be accomplished by disarming the truth predicate of its usual “normative punch” is also canvassed, in effect, in Boghossian 2011, sec. 2. It is there developed under the aegis of explicitly relativistic norms of belief and assertion, however, and, as Boghossian in effect argues, thereby runs into difficulties in conserving Genuine Disagreement.

¹²In proposing to extend the alethic pluralism of *Truth and Objectivity* to embrace a deflated truth property, and to canvass a home for this property in discourse of basic taste, I pursue a suggestion in parallel to that of Ferrari and Moruzzi (2019). They and I both need, however, to defang the Inflationary Argument of chapter 1 of *Truth and Objectivity*. For reasons of space, I shall not here attempt a comparison of their critique of that argument with the line of objection developed in the Appendix below.

normative role on the truth predicate, and then eliciting from it certain disanalogies between the behaviour of “true” and that of “assertible” when clauses to which they are applied are embedded within negation or—though this was not elaborated in *Truth and Objectivity*—within tense. So, I concluded, since assertibility is certainly normative over any discourse meeting the conditions of minimal truth aptitude glossed above, it follows that we have to recognise *two distinct* norms operative over any minimally truth-apt discourse.

I now think that while the argument to that point is correct, the implicit assumption that one of the contrasted norms in question is expressed by the truth predicate is resistible. The disanalogies in behaviour between “true” and “assertible” are attributable, indeed, to the operation of norms contrasting with assertibility, but the additional norms concerned are norms of denial, mandated neutrality (abstinence from both assertion and denial), and—for the case of embeddings within the tenses—norms of retraction and correction. In short, minimally truth-apt discourses are subject to a range of norms of use besides assertibility, but it is not the role of the truth predicate to register a norm that mandates assertion but contrasts with assertibility. Or at least, that interpretation of its role is not forced.

So, if I am right about this, the way is clear for the alethic pluralist to acknowledge deflationism as potentially a *locally* correct account of truth.

8 | OUTLINE OF A USE-THEORETIC ACCOUNT OF THE RELEVANT DISCOURSES

My suggestion, then, is that this refined deflationism is available to help us sustain after all the idea that while, in suitable cases, to deny an assertion—that sushi is delicious, for example, or that former president George W. Bush's many public gaffes were comical—is of course to be committed to regarding it as false, there need be no imputation of fault, of some relevant norm violated, in the contrary assertion. How should this idea be developed?

I draw in what follows on Ferrari and Wright 2017. The development proceeds in two stages. First, let us be mindful that, where truth is deflated and so registers no independent norm operative over the acceptance and assertion of statements, an account of meaning—of correct linguistic practice—has to proceed in other, non-truth-conditional, broadly *use-theoretic* terms. So we need to focus directly on the use of the signature statements in discourses where the Folk View seems intuitively apt.

What we then find is that there is, in these discourses, a distinction in use between what I shall here term the *objectifying* idiom exemplified by “Sushi is delicious” and “The party is going to be fun” and the corresponding *subjective-relational* reports: “I find sushi delicious” or “Sushi tastes delicious *to me*,” and “I’m going to enjoy the party” or “The party will be fun *for me*.” Moreover, it appears that our practice is to treat the objectifying claims as in general somehow stronger: witness that, in a wide class of contexts, a subjective-relational claim provides a fallback when an objectifying statement runs into difficulty. Filippo asserts, “The sushi is delicious” but then finds that all his dining companions are expressing regret at ordering it and falls back to “Well, I am enjoying it at any rate.”

So we should ask: What does an objectifying statement—an *O-statement*—add to an associated subjective-relational (explicitly autocentric) report—an *S-R statement*? Or better, in order to correct any tacit truth-conditional resonances in that way of putting the question, let's ask: What are the connections and contrasts in *use* between the two types of claim?

Two are salient. First, as just noted, S-R statements often provide a fallback in cases where a corresponding O-statement emerges as inappropriate, or is defeated. “This ride is terrific fun!” says Patrick to his companions on the Coney Island *Cyclone* but then, noticing their frozen, grey-faced expressions, retreats to “Well, I am enjoying it, anyway.” Second, S-R statements characteristically express an *assertibility condition* for a corresponding O-statement: the

O-statement may be asserted on the basis of one's recognising in oneself an affect or response (an *S-R response*) that would verify the S-R statement.¹³

Third, O-statements often carry a normative payload (of their target's *deserving* or *being suitable for*, and so on, the relevant subjective affect) that a corresponding S-R statement lacks. One can find things funny, for example, which additional information may cause one to reckon are not funny at all, and when that happens, the characteristic effect of the additional information is to call into question the fittingness of one's original response. One's natural sense of humour may also be overridden by moral considerations. Children have to learn not only that they shouldn't *express* their amusement at certain kinds of thing but also that they shouldn't find them funny in the first place.

Does, for example, “delicious” pattern with “funny” in that respect? It is a nice question. Information about how *pâté de foie gras* is produced may properly disincline one ever to eat it—even perhaps to campaign against the cruelty involved in its production. But it is not so clear that it should tend to defeat the claim that it is delicious, or to show that one shouldn't find it delicious *if* one (maybe inadvertently) eats it. Mindful that different taste predicates may differ in subtle such respects, and making no claim to comprehensiveness, we can nevertheless propose a provisional taxonomy of potential defeaters for O-statements of taste that, crucially, are not also defeaters for corresponding S-R statements. It should include at least the following four defeaters.

- a. *Stability*. Lack of stability in one's subjective reactions across a relevantly similar range of cases may defeat an O-statement. More specifically, it may undermine the status of an S-R response as warranting the assertion of the O-statement. Sometimes, let's suppose, you enjoy playing a not-too-serious game of Bridge and the “craic” over the cards; other times—it's not clear why—you cannot get involved and quickly get bored. Mindful of this, you can truly report, on an appropriate occasion, that “I am enjoying the cards tonight” but should not assert, “Bridge is fun.”
- b. *Community*. A substantial lack of agreement often functions as a defeater for an O-statement—recall Patrick's reaction to the dismay of his companions on the rollercoaster, and Filippo's to his dinner companions' reaction to the sushi.
- c. *Robustness*. One's subjective response may be widely shared yet still be defeated as a ground for an O-statement by relations of subordination among different kinds of values. The British comic magician Tommy Cooper's slithering down the stage curtain during a trick got a laugh from most members of the audience until they realised that it wasn't part of his act but signalled that he was unwell—actually, suffering a fatal heart attack. More generally, statements about what is funny, and also about what is fun, are defeasible by moral considerations about hurt and harm. Conversely, an O-statement of disgust prompted by, say, witnessing a birth may be defeated by considerations of its sheer biological normality and the value of the end product, a new human life brought into the world.
- d. *Typicality*. Certain physical or psychological conditions—for instance, intake of laughing gas or alcohol, bipolar mental illness, residues of strong toothpaste or blue cheese in one's mouth, depression, or the side effects on one's taste buds of recent chemotherapy—are standardly treated as dependable sources of distortion, inhibition, or exaggeration of a relevant range of S-R responses and consequently as disqualifying them as grounds for a normally associated type of O-statement.

¹³As a referee for *Metaphilosophy* pointed out to me, this claim—that the occurrence in oneself of an S-R response warrants, *ceteris paribus*, the endorsement of an appropriately associated O-statement—lapses if it is an *exocentric* use of the O-statement that is under consideration.

Now, let me stress again that it is one thing to grant that considerations in these four categories, and perhaps others, are potential defeaters of O-statements in circumstances where a suitable S-R statement is true, that is, that they disqualify the occurrence of an otherwise appropriate subjective response as a ground for the assertion. It is another thing to assume that they do so because they tend to override, or undermine, the status of that response as *evidence* for the obtaining of a state of affairs that would make the relevant O-statement true. Our local deflationism debar us from assuming that both the evidential connection and the disparities in use between O-statements and corresponding S-R statements need to be recovered from *the relations between their respective truth conditions*, between the kinds of states of affairs that are apt to make them, respectively, true. We can, and must, drop the idea that assertoric content has to go hand in hand with truth-conditional content. To be sure, assertoric content does go hand in hand with amenability to a disquotational truth predicate, but it is a further step to take this to be amenability to representation or some other substantial notion of truth. The discrepancies in the conditions of defeat of O-statements and S-R statements do not demand and, I am contending, should not be taken as demanding explanation in terms of divergent truth conditions.

How else, then? This is not the occasion to embark on a full development of the minimalist alternative. But in barest outline, in the second stage of a fuller development, the question focused on will not be: what kind of fact must O-statements be taken to describe if both their assertibility on the basis of an appropriate S-R response and their conditions of defeasibility adumbrated above are to be explained, but rather: what point would the institution of such assertions serve—why would it be worthwhile having a practice in which such statements were treated as assertible on the basis of S-R responses but defeasible under the kinds of conditions reviewed?

Here is where it helps to be mindful that in core cases of discourses where the Folk View seems intuitive, we are dealing with expressions of *value*: of things to cherish, pursue, discourage, and avoid. Not all values are things that everybody cares about. Amoralism and philistinism are, in varying degrees, not unusual. But values of personal taste are important to everybody. And we care because the S-R responses on which they are grounded are absolutely integral to our humanity and our engagement with life. A world in which we found nothing funny, or fun, or delicious, or exciting, or attractive, and so on, would be a world in which it was not worth living. And a world in which our lives were dominated by negative S-R responses—of disgust, distaste, boredom, blandness, and ugliness—would be a living hell.

Focusing now on the positive S-R responses, a reminder may be apt of a range of mundane and contingent but very important facts about them. First, in a wide class of cases, our enjoyment of values of taste, the intensity of the associated S-R responses, is characteristically enhanced by *sharing and socialisation*: the ride is more fun when others are with you and enjoying it too; we like to eat together; we—most of us, at least—prefer to go to the theatre with friends. Second, we do *naturally* share many of these responses. Third, they are also in many cases to a high degree *tractable*—one can acquire and refine patterns of response of these kinds by experience and education. Fourth, many of these responses have a *rich causal provenance* in their objects, which is receptive to study, technique, and manufacture—to the arts of cuisine, comedy, musical composition and performance, dance, and drama. Fifth, we do regard these responses as subject to conditions of *appropriateness* in the light of other of our social and personal values.

All of these factors combine to create a situation where we have an interest in having an idiom that enables us, more than merely reporting a response we personally have, to *project* it as a possible point of co-ordination, something that may be shared and thereby enhanced, is dependable rather than ephemeral, something that is a reaction of our normal, healthy selves, and free of taints of spite, schadenfreude, cruelty, and other morally reprehensible features, and whose causal prompts it may be worthwhile to understand with a view to developing an associated art.

I am not of course suggesting that ordinary speakers characteristically have such considerations in mind in making O-statements. Rather, even in this whistle-stop overview, the beginnings can be seen of how an account might run of the *social utility* of an objectifying idiom of taste, or comedy, which both assigns the importance it had better assign to grounding in personal responses and explains the broad range of defeaters we have noted without any need to reconceive the content of O-statements along contextualist or relativist lines, or to imbue them with substantial truth conditions, or to query appearances of disagreement where ordinary speakers take it to occur. This minimalist approach shares with expressivism a rejection of the idea that in making such statements, we are normally in the business of trying to “report the facts”; but its expressivism is advanced as a thesis of pragmatics—a thesis concerning what participants in a discourse are characteristically doing in endorsing its distinctive kind of evaluations—not a claim about the semantics of the statements in question. And minimalism agrees with relativism both in accepting that basic disagreements about taste are just that—disagreements focused on exactly the shared propositional content that they seem to concern—and in rejecting the idea that in asserting or denying such a content, one purports to represent an objective fact. This anti-realism, however, is now accomplished without any need for relativistic manoeuvrings with the truth predicate.

9 | WHAT IS A FAULTLESS DISAGREEMENT?

So, we are now in position to suggest the following account. Differences of opinion, meeting simultaneously all of the four conditions we have imposed—Faultlessness, Sustainability, Parity, and Genuine Disagreement—can arise within a discourse D when three conditions come into alignment:

- (i) The norms of assertion operative over D mandate X in asserting P and Y in denying P. (Each, for instance, is in position to appropriately assert a respectively suitable S-R statement.)
- (ii) No defeaters: the norms of retraction for D are such that, as it happens, there is no further information to be had that would mandate X in retracting his assertion of P or Y in retracting her denial of it.
- (iii) Assertions within D are subject to no ulterior norm of correctness—such as truth, *non*-deflationarily conceived, would supply.

In short, we can disagree faultlessly about a matter of value when we each take an appropriate view in the light of our respective subjective reactions to the case and when none of the four kinds of defeating conditions earlier reviewed, or any others there overlooked, in virtue of which an assertion of either of our respective O-statements would be deemed inappropriate, actually obtains.

10 | WHAT WENT WRONG WITH THE SIMPLE ARGUMENT?

The answer is “Nothing.” There is nothing wrong with the reasoning. But the formulation of assumption (3):

- (3) Our disagreement is faultless, so involves
no mistake on either side
-
- Assumption for reductio
ad absurdum

emerges as tendentious. More perspicuously, the contrapositive of (3) is tendentious. For to provide a demonstration that it is inconsistent to suppose that neither of the two protagonists is mistaken is not, when truth and falsity are deflated and so normatively inert, to demonstrate that there has to be cognitive-procedural or alethic fault involved in their dispute.

11 | CONCLUDING REMARKS

In closing, let me offer something of a bird's-eye view of the track followed by our dialectic. If the intuitive idea of faultless disagreement is not to reduce to the banality that differences of opinion may merely be fully cognitive-procedurally justified, then the intention of the idea has to be that they may, in the kind of case on which we have focused, reflect no *alethic* fault. But this is, naturally, a hopeless idea if the discourse is thought of as answerable to a single norm of truth with which no statement and its negation can simultaneously comply. So if faultless disagreement is to be a possibility, there must be no such single alethic norm. That leaves two options. One is, in one way or another, to—as it were—fracture the norm, multiply the ways of being true, and spread the pieces around, so that conflicting opinions can each alight on a shard. Each of our relativisms attempts a particular implementation of that option. The other option is to suction out the substance of the alethic norm, leaving only the formal shell to subserve the contrasts whose contours are exploited by the Inflationary Argument. I have argued that the first option will not deliver what is wanted, and that the second is the way to go. I regard it as a strength of the combination of minimalism about truth aptitude and alethic pluralism defended in *Truth and Objectivity* that it provides a natural setting for the elaboration of the second direction.

It has been, in my view, a major lacuna in almost all the recent and contemporary writing about these issues that this minimalist, use-theoretic orientation has been invisible to most of the protagonists, relativist and anti-relativist alike. A more detailed and positive development of it, as well as responses to objections, must await another opportunity.

APPENDIX

ON THE INFLATIONARY ARGUMENT OF CHAPTER 1 OF *TRUTH AND OBJECTIVITY*

We start with the disquotational scheme:

DS “P” is true iff P

Substituting “Not P” for “P” in DS provides

“Not P” is true iff Not P

And negating each side of DS provides

Not (“P” is true) iff Not P

So by transitivity of the biconditional, we have the negation equivalence:

NE “Not P” is true iff Not (“P” is true)

However, in any case where neutral states of information may be envisaged—total states of information justifying the assertion neither of “P” nor of “Not P”—the corresponding schema for assertibility:

“Not P” is assertible iff Not (“P” is assertible)

will fail from right to left. So the DS itself—given only the seemingly uncontroversial principle of the equivalence of the negations of equivalents—enforces a potential divergence in extension between “true” and “assertible.”¹⁴ Moreover, since deflationists regard the DS as an *a priori* principle, providing a complete explanation of the concept of truth, this potential divergence is of the very essence of that concept.

This conclusion becomes problematic for deflationism as soon as one reflects that the DS also imposes a certain normativity on “true.” Specifically, it enjoins that reason to assert, or to accept, that “P” is true is *eo ipso* reason to assert, or to accept P. Hence “true” is in that sense minimally normative over assertion of the members of the substitution class for “P” in the DS. So, of course, is “assertible.” Indeed, as was observed in chapter 1 of *Truth and Objectivity*, a stronger conclusion follows from the status assigned to the DS: that “true” and “assertible” coincide in positive normative force over belief and assertion: reason to regard “P” as true is *eo ipso* reason to regard it as assertible, and conversely. The potential divergence in extension ensures, nevertheless, that although to pursue the one norm is in this sense to pursue the other, successful capture of the one need not be successful capture of the other. And this result, it was suggested, is too big for deflationism, as normally formulated, to chew.

It's important to stress that the significance of this finding, if it is sustained, is not in its content but in its provenance. Richer—for instance, representationalist—conceptions of truth will likely regard it as the merest banality that being true is one thing and being assertible (acceptable) something else. What is, perhaps, surprising is that the distinction seems to be enforced merely by the DS and the possibility of neutral states of information.

Before considering how a deflationist should respond to this train of thought, it will be useful to approach its conclusion from another angle. Consider not negation but tense. It is constitutive of our understanding of the tenses that certain principles (the so-called Truth-Value Links) operate to connect *a priori* the truth-values of differently tensed sentences uttered at different times. Thus, for example, “It is raining today” if uttered today is true if and only if “It will be raining tomorrow” was true if uttered yesterday. And “It was raining” is true if uttered today if and only if “It is raining” was true if uttered at some time in the past. Let's regiment the tenses as operators, “Past,” “Pres,” “Fut,” and so forth, on tenseless propositional radicals—(making no assumption about whether that is ultimately a philosophically felicitous treatment)—and write {“Past P”*t*}, {“Fut P”*t*}, and so on, to denote utterances of the enquoted sentences at a variable time *t*. Then when *t*₁ antedates *t*₂, we get a battery of principles, among the simplest of which are, for example, these:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{Fut/Pres} & (\forall t_1)[\text{True}\{\text{“Will P”}t_1\} \text{ iff } (\exists t_2)(\text{True}\{\text{“Pres P”}t_2\})] \\ \text{Past/Pres} & (\forall t_2)[\text{True}\{\text{“Past P”}t_2\} \text{ iff } (\exists t_1)(\text{True}\{\text{“Pres P”}t_1\})]^{15} \end{array}$$

Suppose, accordingly, that the truth-value links are regarded as solid. Then once again it is striking that the corresponding principles with all occurrences of “true” replaced by “assertible,”

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{Fut/Pres}^{\text{Ass}} & (\forall t_1)[\text{Assertible}\{\text{“Will P”}t_1\} \text{ iff } (\exists t_2)(\text{Assertible}\{\text{“Pres P”}t_2\})] \\ \text{Past/Pres}^{\text{Ass}} & (\forall t_2)[\text{Assertible}\{\text{“Past P”}t_2\} \text{ iff } (\exists t_1)(\text{Assertible}\{\text{“Pres P”}t_1\})] \end{array}$$

fail of validity in both directions. Fut/Pres^{Ass} fails left to right because of the possibility of *disappointments*—because it may happen that a fully assertible prediction is never fulfilled, with all later states of information warranting its denial. It fails right to left because of the possibility of *surprises*—because it may happen that a present-tensed claim is warrantably assertible although its future-tensed counterpart was never assertible in any previous

¹⁴I assume here that the biconditional that features in the argument generates an extensional context.

¹⁵The form displayed won't serve, of course, for compound tenses.

state of information. Past/Pres^{Ass} fails left to right because of the possibility of *retrospective discoveries*—because it may happen that we acquire a warrant for thinking that something was earlier so for which there was no evidence at the time. It fails right to left because of the possibility of *defeaters*—because new information overrides or undermines an earlier warranted assertion about a then contemporaneous situation.

So, the Inflationary Argument is reinforced. The ways in which “true” and “assertible,” respectively, interact with tenses and negation conspire to enforce the idea that “true,” as characterised by the DS and by the truth-value links, marks a dimension in which an assertion can be in good/bad standing that potentially contrasts with warrant. And that won’t marry with the conception of it as a device whose presence in the language is needed only for the purposes of generalisation and indirect endorsement that are recognised by deflationism.

Well, there is, I think, room for manoeuvre. The foregoing considerations certainly do allow of interpretation as enforcing a conception of an assertion’s truth as a circumstance of good standing, contrasting with its being warranted in a particular state of information. And, for my part, I think the *wholesale* repudiation of any such conception of truth, which I take to be part of the stock-in-trade of deflationism, is both unattractive and unmotivated. I also think that to accept such a “substantial” conception of truth is not immediately to segue into an acceptance of truth as consisting in successful representation, or correspondence, in some metaphysically substantial sense—that proposals working with coherence, or one form or another of idealised assertibility, for example, can identify suitable alternative “circumstances of good standing” to service the contrasts imposed. What the Inflationary Argument enforces *at a minimum* is, however, nothing of that kind but only that, in any discourse dealing in truth-apt contents subject to the DS and standard behaviour by negation and tense, there will be norms operative over the use of its statements additional to simple assertibility—norms of *restraint*, as required by the possibility of neutral states of information, and norms of *retraction*, and *denial*, as required by the possibility of shifting states of information serving to undermine, or override, existing warrants. Any discourse controlled by such a complex pattern of norms will, once “true” is introduced via the DS, throw up the contrasts between “true” and “assertible” that drive the Inflationary Argument. The deflationist counter should thus be that while this behaviour by the truth predicate does indeed mark the operation of norms over the discourse contrasting with simple assertibility, it is a further step to associate it with a “circumstance of good standing” so contrasted. There is an alternative: the enforced contrasts between “true” and “assertible” may be taken to reflect, still under the aegis of a fully deflated understanding of the former, the operation of norms—of restraint, denial, and retraction—that supplement norms of assertibility and articulate the shifting patterns of evidential significance and dominance relationships sustained by the variable states of information that we enjoy at different times.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to the participants at the Budapest *Meta-theories of Disagreement* conference in October 2019 for helpful comments and criticisms, and to audiences at workshops and colloquia at Bologna, Johns Hopkins University, St. Andrews, the Oxford Jowett Society, Leeds, Stirling, Durham, and the Institute of Philosophy in London, where I have given talks on these ideas in recent times. Special thanks are due to Paul Boghossian for many discussions of the issues over the years, and to my co-members of the *Relativism and Rational Tolerance* project funded by the Leverhulme Trust at the Northern Institute of Philosophy in Aberdeen between 2012 and 2015: Carl Baker, Alex Plakias, Filippo Ferrari, Giacomo Melis, and Patrick Greenough. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Leverhulme Trust.

REFERENCES

- Belnap, Nuel D., Michael Perloff, and Ming Xu. 2001. *Facing the Future: Agents and Choices in Our Indeterminist World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Boghossian, Paul. 2011. "Three Kinds of Relativism." In *A Companion to Relativism*, edited by S. D. Hales, 53–69. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Brogaard, Berit. 2008. "In Defence of a Perspectival Semantics for 'Know'." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 86:439–59.
- Cappelen, Herman, and John Hawthorne. 2009. *Relativism and Monadic Truth*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Douven, Igor. 2011. "Relativism and Confirmation Theory." In *A Companion to Relativism*, edited by S. D. Hales, 242–65. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Egan, Andy. 2007. "Epistemic Modals, Relativism, and Assertion." *Philosophical Studies* 133:1–22.
- Egan, Andy. 2010. "Disputing About Taste." In *Disagreement*, edited by R. Feldman and T. A. Warfield, 247–92. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Egan, Andy. 2011. "Relativism About Epistemic Modals." In *A Companion to Relativism*, edited by S. D. Hales, 219–41. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Egan, Andy, John Hawthorne, and Brian Weatherson. 2004. "Epistemic Modals in Context." In *Contextualism in Philosophy*, edited by G. Preyer and P. Peters, 131–69. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Eriksson, John. 2016. "Expressivism, Attitudinal Complexity and Two Senses of Disagreement in Attitude." *D Erkenntnis* 81:775–94. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9767-5>
- Ferrari, Filippo, and Sebastiano Moruzzi. 2019. "Ecumenical Alethic Pluralism." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 49, no. 3:368–93. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1493880>
- Ferrari, Filippo, and Crispin Wright. 2017. "Talking with Vultures." *Mind* 126:911–36.
- Gillies, Anthony. 2010. "Iffiness." *Semantics and Pragmatics* 3:1–42.
- Goodwin, Geoffrey P., and John M. Darley. 2008. "The Psychology of Meta-ethics: Exploring Objectivism." *Cognition* 106, no. 3:1339–66.
- Goodwin, Geoffrey P., and John M. Darley. 2009. "The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy." *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 1, no. 2:161–88.
- Goodwin, Geoffrey P., and John M. Darley. 2012. "Why Are Some Moral Beliefs Perceived to Be More Objective Than Others?" *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 48:250–56.
- Huvenes, Torfinn. 2012. "Varieties of Disagreement and Predicates of Taste." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 90, no. 1:167–81.
- Kölbel, Max. 2004. "Faultless Disagreement." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 104:53–73.
- Kolodny, Niko, and John MacFarlane. 2010. "Ifs and Oughts." *Journal of Philosophy* 107:115–43.
- Kompa, Nikola. 2002. "The Context Sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions." *Grazer philosophische Studien* 64:79–96.
- Laserson, Peter. 2005. "Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste." *Linguistics and Philosophy* 28:643–86.
- López de Sa, Dan. 2008. "Presuppositions of Commonality." In *Relative Truth*, edited by M. Garcia-Carpintero and M. Kölbel, 297–310. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- MacFarlane, John. 2014. *Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Richard, Mark. 2004. "Contextualism and Relativism." *Philosophical Studies* 119:215–42.
- Richard, Mark. 2008. *When Truth Gives Out*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shapiro, Stewart, and William W. Taschek. 1996. "Intuitionism, Pluralism, and Cognitive Command." *Journal of Philosophy* 20, no. 2:74–88.
- Stephenson, Tamina. 2007. "Judge Dependence, Epistemic Modals, and Predicates of Personal Taste." *Linguistics and Philosophy* 30:487–525.
- Weatherson, Brian. 2009. "Conditionals and Indexical Relativism." *Synthese* 166:333–57.
- Wright, Crispin. 1992. *Truth and Objectivity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Wright, Crispin. 1998. "Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume* 24 (Pragmatism), edited by C. Misak, 31–74.
- Wright, Crispin. 2001. "On Being in a Quandary: Relativism Vagueness Logical Revisionism." *Mind* 110, no. 437: 45–98.
- Wright, Crispin. 2006. "Intuitionism, Realism, Relativism and Rhubarb." In *Truth and Realism*, edited by P. Greenough and M. Lynch, 38–60. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wyatt, Jeremy. 2018. "Absolutely Tasty: An Examination of Predicates of Personal Taste and Faultless Disagreement." *Inquiry* 61, no. 3:252–80.
- Yu, Andy. 2016. "Epistemic Modals and Sensitivity to Contextually-Salient Partitions". *Thought: A Journal of Philosophy* 5, no. 2:134–46.

How to cite this article: Wright, Crispin. Alethic pluralism, deflationism, and faultless disagreement. *Metaphilosophy*. 2021;52:432–448. <https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12491>