What about struggling to formulate something of which one is dimly aware? Is it really a necessary part of our idea of meanings, thoughts, and rules that they must be unmysteriously and easily available to us? There are some deep issues here, about conceptual conservatism, about whether we can draw a sharp line between analytic and synthetic, about whether the 'grammar' of our language is up to us and whether and how it might change. Baker and Hacker have a stand to take on these matters, and one can see the coherence in the overall view which emerges. But we do not have in these books the slow and sensitive discussion which might convince us that the view was right.

In considering content as opposed to style, I have so far been mainly concerned with LSN. So I turn now to a few further remarks about SRL. Baker and Hacker maintain in many places that Kripke and Wright argue for a sceptical epistemological view—namely that one cannot be certain what rule anyone is following. But this is a serious misrepresentation. The initial approach is via epistemology but the position reached is soon an ontological one—namely that in some sense of 'fact' there is no fact as to what I or another mean (cf. Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*, p. 21). The 'sceptical solution' or 'community view' is designed to repair the damage, both ontological and epistemological, by restoring validity to our claims about the existence of rule following and also to our claims about knowledge of it. Baker and Hacker do at times recognize that the sceptical solution is supposed to do some work. But they have (as mentioned above) only over-hasty and crude attempts at demolition. An irony here is that they seem unaware of a marked resemblance between their own favoured account (in terms of 'defeasible criteria' and 'the grammar of the language') and the 'assertion conditions' view favoured by Kripke and Wright. If the latter ultimately fails because it cannot give enough reality to norms and thoughts then, arguably, Baker and Hacker's view will fail for related reasons.

Overall both these books are disappointing. Important questions are addressed (perhaps too many of them) and relevant considerations begin to be raised. But the haste, dogmatism, and, above all, the bad temper make them unpleasant and unrewarding reading.

University of Newcastle Upon Tyne JANE HEAL

Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. By Simon Blackburn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. Pp. xi + 368. £16.00, paper £6.95.

Many of its practitioners claim a special, even a fundamental, importance for the philosophy of language in philosophy generally. But it has become an area increasingly difficult of access. The reasons are several: a tendency for specialists to write for an intended audience of specialists, a predilection for technical issues and technical approaches to non-technical issues, and the sheer difficulty of the questions that have come into prominence, are three. The want of a comprehensive introductory text, aimed at the needs of undergraduate teaching, has been felt keenly for some time. A number of attempts have been made, but Simon Blackburn's is by far the most distinguished to date.

This distinction is partly due to the lucidity and intelligence of the presentation, flowing from a thorough knowledge of the issues treated, and to the good humour of Blackburn's writing. But equally important is the fact that the book is very much more than a collection of introductory essays. The directions of interest taken by academic philosophy are perennially in danger of being dictated by fashion, prompted by the teachings and writings of one or two charismatic individuals. Blackburn is determined to display that the contemporary interest in philosophy of language is not of this character: that modern philosophy of language can be shown to be harnessed to the 'great perennial problems of philosophy (which) can be felt by any reflective persons' (p. v). Thus *Spreading the Word*, besides being an introduction, is also an *apology* for the philosophy of language: it aims to map the deep conceptual roots of problems in this area of philosophy, to display their connections with each other and with traditional metaphysics and epistemology, and thereby to render the point and interest of the discipline unmistakable.

It is of course impossible to write a good book on this scale about any part of philosophy without saying a great deal that is controversial and stimulating on the actual issues discussed; but Blackburn's determination to make clear sense of the field as a whole provides for interest of a different kind, even for the professional specialist. Not many of us, I suspect, much enjoy thinking as hard about the fundamentals of our subject as the careful reading of Blackburn's book demands; the exercise is salutary. Moreover, the author's belief in the importance of the philosophy of language is qualified by the conviction that it leads, at various points, back into epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Those who have been encouraged to hope that the theory of meaning, in particular, might prove to be the corner-stone of all philosophy are posed a number of challenges by this book.

Much of the range of *Spreading the Word* is predictable. Traditional empiricism versus Wittgenstein on meaning, the idea of a recursive theory of meaning, problems in interpreting the relation between the axioms of such a theory and the speakers whose competence it is supposed to explain, truth-conditional versus Gricean approaches to meaning, anti-realist objections to the truth-conditional approach, radical interpretation and indeterminacy of meaning, correspondence versus coherence accounts of truth, Tarski, names and definite descriptions all get a fairish share of attention. There are some welcome, and one or two surprising, additional inclusions: it is nice to have the discussion of Locke and Berkeley on understanding merge with consideration of Fodor on 'the language of thought'; and a testament both to recent movement within the field and Blackburn's determination to display the links with other parts of philosophy that he includes an extensive discussion of Wittgenstein's ideas on rule following and their disputed connections with psychological privacy. There is an especially clear presentation of original moves in the correspondence-coherence debate between Russell and Bradley. Perhaps the most surprising of all, one chapter out of the nine is entirely devoted to exposition of Humean 'projectivism' about morals and to the claim—styled 'quasi-realism' by Blackburn—that such a view may legitimately appropriate for itself all the linguistic devices characteristic of genuinely factual assertoric discourse. Inevitably, since Blackburn means his book to be read as a whole, the limit on its desirable length placed by its intended introductory role results in several disappointing omissions. There is nothing on analyticity, vagueness,

quantification or the notion of a logical constant. There is very little on necessity, possibility, possible-world semantics, counterfactuals and the proper analysis of conditionals in general. Some topics, for example metaphor, are treated so cursorily that it is unlikely that the interest of an inexperienced reader will be excited; while elsewhere, for instance in the early discussion of the psychological reality of semantic rules, and the treatment of the contingent a priori in the final chapter, Blackburn has original suggestions to make to which he gives so little space that they are left open to obvious queries which there is no indication how he would answer. But complaint of this kind must, in fairness, be severely qualified by due acknowledgement of the constraints under which the author is operating and of the very high quality of much of the discussion.

One foreseeable effect of essaying the kind of rational *Übersicht* of a discipline which Blackburn attempts is that you come to see little point in certain celebrated theses and projects, or at least far less point than would justify the attention which they have actually commanded. Such is the fate here of Grice on meaning and Tarski on truth. Grice is credited with an insight only into what it is for a 'one-off' non-conventional performance to mean something; and Tarski, so far as I can see, is credited with no substantial philosophical insight into the notion of truth at all. But those who prefer to think differently will not find Blackburn—even with his introductory guide's hat on—an easy opponent. The discussion of private language, in particular, ought to make Wittgensteinians think pretty hard. It brings out vividly the folly of constructing versions of Wittgenstein's argument which, however genuine the difficulties which they display for the private linguist, can be paralleled by problems for the language of a community. In addition, Blackburn's response (pp. 100–1) to the challenge posed by *Investigations* S258 (viz. just let the private linguist become a *theorist* and the conservatism in sound scientific method—we don't reject well-entrenched theories just on the basis of the odd discordant observation—will provide the means for his drawing the seems right/is right distinction) warrants the most serious consideration.[1] (I myself believe that Blackburn eventually loses the point; see my 'Does Wittgenstein have a Cogent Argument Against Private Language? *Investigations* S258–260', forthcoming.[2] But there is no doubt that he has advanced the discussion.)

Another *cause célèbre* which gets a specially short shrift here is the anti-realist argument that an understanding of the classical realist conception of truth has no distinctive display—the so-called 'manifestation challenge'. Blackburn's reply (pp. 65–6) keeps company with recent comment by writers like Craig and McDowell:[3] manifestation is a relational matter—what can be manifested depends in part on the resources of the *manifestee*. Put him in the position of a radical interpreter, when his data are restricted to presently observable situations and the audible and visible responses of the subject, and it may very well be impossible for the latter distinctively to manifest a recognition-transcendent conception of truth. But

[1] Cf. also Blackburn, 'The Individual Strikes Back', *Synthese* 58 (1984).

[2] In J. McDowell and P. Pettit, eds., *Context, Content and Thought*, Oxford University Press (1985).

[3] See e.g. E.J. Craig, 'Meaning, Use and Privacy' *Mind* (1982), and 'Privacy and Rule-Following' in J. Butterfield, ed., *Language, Mind and Logic*, Cambridge University Press (1986). Compare J. McDowell, 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule', *Synthese* 58 (1984); and 'In Defence of Modesty' in B. Taylor, ed., *Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett*, Martinus Nijhoff (1985).

then Tortelier would find it difficult to manifest his musicianship to an audience of the musically untrained. What is the difference? In general, what can be manifested to you depends on what you know; so, Blackburn concludes, the manifestation challenge can get a grip, if at all, only when augmented by independent work in the theory of knowledge telling us what kind of audience the attempt to manifest realist conceptions may non-question-beggingly confront.

The best way of seeing that this response is off-beam is to let the audience consist of native speakers of the same language as the manifestor. Let the question be, for example, how I am to manifest to you my possession of a recognition-transcendent conception of the truth conditions of the sentence 'you are in pain', as utterable by me. Evidently the answer has to be: by manifesting understanding of the sentence. For the realist view is, precisely, a view about what that understanding *is*. However it *appears* to be consistent with my using the sentence in exemplary manner—being disposed to assent and dissent from it in appropriate circumstances, attaching the right sort of implications to its assertibility, etc.—that I actually have no such conception but *only* the complex of recognitional and inferential skills which the anti-realist claims constitute my understanding of the sentence. Notice that this is not the point that any finite segment of my behaviour may take a form consistent with supposing that I understand the sentence when in fact I do not. The point is *not* inductive sceptical. It is that the realist's account opens up a gap between what understanding really is and the practical abilities which he wants to see as issuing from it. Closing the gap and answering the manifestation challenge are one and the same thing. While it remains, there *has* to be scope for the question: what could possibly count as evidence for supposing that someone has the relevant conception when *all possible* actual and hypothetical data, even if uniformly favourable to the hypothesis on the realist view, are consistent with its falsity? The anti-realist line of thought is essentially very simple: first, it cannot be *explanatory* to advance such a hypothesis in these circumstances, so the attempt philosophically to understand understanding ought to forswear all commerce with such hypotheses; second, the equation of understanding with possession of the relevant practical abilities does not give rise to a similar difficulty. The point does have a Quinean ring to it: for it is, in part, that the distinction between classical truth-conditional and anti-realist accounts of my understanding of the sentence is underdetermined by all possible data. What Blackburn's discussion misses is that this claim awaits rebuttal even after we include 'data' accessible to all speakers of English. (Whether Blackburn is right to hold that a reliance on the device of the radical translator would in fact divest the argument of conviction is, of course, another matter.)

It is, however, in the chapter on projectivism that the author's own special philosophical interests are most clearly to the fore. This and the immediately succeeding chapter on truth seem to me to contain some of the most stimulating material in the book. The issue on which they overlap is a fundamental one. A great many regions of assertoric discourse—moral, aesthetic, and other evaluations, talk of secondary qualities in Locke's sense, theoretical science, pure mathematics, as well as philosophical theorizing about possible worlds, are all examples—give rise to a realist/anti-realist dispute. A realist about one of the areas will hold, as usual, that its statements are associated with determinate truth conditions which the world may or may not objectively realize. If he is anti-reductionist, he will

hold in addition that no independent account can be given of these truth conditions in terms of a more basic or epistemologically more favoured vocabulary; a realist of this sort about theoretical science, for instance, would hold not merely that our theories can be objectively true or false but also that the world 'contains' states of affairs for whose satisfactory description the use of distinctively scientific-theoretical vocabulary is indispensable. Such a realism, provided the assigned truth conditions meet the Dummettian requirements, need not clash with anti-realism of the sort we were just concerned with. Its natural antagonists are rather the reductionist and anyone who wishes to dispute the reality of the facts in question.

What are the options open to an anti-realist of the latter sort? One would be iconoclasm: cut the talk in question—deal not in the analytic (Quine), in possible worlds, in meaning (Kripke's Sceptic), or in moral judgement (Nietzsche). How indigestible such a response may be varies from area to area but it goes deeply against the grain to think that ethics, science, pure maths, and aesthetics, for instance, are merely superstitious. The alternative is projectivism: the view that the 'statements' in question enjoy a perfectly legitimate role, only not that of the attempted depiction of fact. In typical cases—Blackburn usually has moral judgement and the Humean view of causation in mind—they serve rather to project back on to the world aspects of our response to it. We, so to speak, 'spread the word' on the world; the claim, for instance, that events of one kind cause those of another is to be viewed not as the hypothesis of a transcendental bonding but as a way in which we are trained to express our confidence in the dependable co-occurrence of instances of the two event types in actual and counterfactual circumstances (p. 211).

The great attraction of projectivism is that it promises to sidestep certain epistemological difficulties which beset the opposing factualism—do we have special faculties sensitive to moral and aesthetic truth, and to logical necessity, for instance, and is not the evidence for our statements about theoretical entities, even at its best, altogether too precarious?—while avoiding both the catastrophic loss which we would generally see as involved in iconoclasm and the difficult, often impossible, demand for reduction. Blackburn believes that the projectivist has an important and progressive research programme in a number of areas, most notably with statements concerning morals and logical necessity. At the same time he takes a somewhat negative view of the bearing of the philosophy of language on the issue: specifically, he believes that one important type of argument from the philosophy of language against projectivism is mistaken. The argument (p. 189 and following), due to Geach and originally to Frege, is simply that to hold that no genuine statements are effected by moral sentences, etc., that they serve not for asserting but for expressing, evincing, projecting, or whatever, leaves utterly unexplained their capacity to undergo the kind of embedding in statement-forming contexts—most notably conditionals, expressions of propositional attitude, and the like—which would naturally be regarded as the hallmark of genuine statements. If this were correct, the projectivist would face the prospect of at least a partial iconoclasm after all: he could, for instance, continue to grant the propriety of using moral language provided we abstain from inferences like:

It is wrong to tell lies; if it is wrong to tell lies, it is wrong to get your little brother to tell lies; so it is wrong to get your little brother to tell lies (p. 190).

Inferences of this sort would be out of order because, if Geach were right, the projectivist has no way of construing the antecedent of the major premiss. Blackburn's *quasi-realism* is, for a given area of discourse, exactly the thesis that the projectivist can account for all linguistic devices in use in that area which otherwise would be thought to betray a commitment to realism. But once the quasi-realist programme has been carried through, Blackburn's opinion would seem to be that the philosophy of language has no further bearing on the issue between the projectivist and the realist. I shall return to this.

We have seen how projectivism can seem an attractive option. And it would, presumably, be our intuitive predilection with judgements about what is funny, or revolting, e.g. But how may it be motivated in more controversial areas where realist predispositions may die hard? One interesting form of argument[4] which Blackburn expounds in some detail proceeds from consideration of relations of *supervenience*. For Blackburn, a property ψ supervenes on a property ϕ just in case, while it is not necessarily true that everything ϕ is ψ—a fortiori ϕ is no *analysis* of ψ—it is necessarily true that if anything is both ϕ and ψ, then everything ϕ is ψ. Formally,

Nec. $[(\exists\chi)(\phi\chi \wedge \psi\chi) \rightarrow (\chi)(\phi\chi \rightarrow \psi\chi)]$

but not:

Nec. $[(\chi)\phi\chi \rightarrow \psi\chi)]$

Traditional forms of anti-reductionist moral realism typically charged their opponents to establish principles of the second sort (where ψ is some moral quality and ϕ a candidate for explication, in non-moral terms, of ψ's condition of application). Blackburn's thought is that such a moral realist ought to find it equally disconcerting if a principle of the first kind can be shown to hold. For if ψ really were an 'autonomous' quality, there would be—or so one would expect—no *conceptual* obstacle to its floating free, so to speak, of any other quality to which it stood in no interesting analytic relationship. But that is just what supervenience excludes: the effect of Blackburn's account is precisely that while there is no necessity that ψ should invariably accompany ϕ, it is necessary that if it ever does so, it must *always* do so. It is plausible that such principles do indeed hold in the moral case. If ϕ is, for instance, a complete description in non-moral vocabulary of an action, it does appear to be part of the sense in which moral judgement is *principled* that any other action meeting the same description should deserve the same moral appraisal; and this point is quite consistent with holding that Moore demonstrated the irreducibility of moral to non-moral vocabulary. If moral qualities were indeed *sui generis*, sensible perhaps to special moral faculties, what could be the explanation of this *conceptual* constraint?

This seems to me to be a nice point against its target. But whether it is an argument for projectivism about morals depends (a) on whether the projectivist can make a better fist of explaining the supervenience; and (b) on the unavailability of any other kind of moral realism which can explain it. I am not sure that either condition is met. If judgements about what is funny are paradigm projections, it is notable that the supervenience claim is very implausible for their case: there is

[4] Cf. his 'Moral Realism' in J. Casey, ed., *Morality and Moral Reasoning*, Methuen (1971); and 'Supervenience Revisited' in I. Hacking, ed., *Exercises in Analysis*, Cambridge University Press (1984).

no obligation of consistency—you are quite entitled not to laugh on the second occasion at what you found funny on the first, and indeed it is generally recognized that (a significant class of) jokes 'wear thin'. If moral judgements were projections, would it not be as likely that our responses would 'float free', and is not supervenience therefore equally a problem for the moral projectivist as for the realist above? It would be no answer to suggest that projections of approval and dissatisfaction do not count as *moral* unless disciplined by supervenience. That simply invites rephrasal of the question to the projectivist in the form: why is there such a thing as *moral* projection at all—why not let this range of responses float free and call them something else?

Blackburn's answer (p. 186) would be that such a system of valuation would be unfit for the purposes for which we moralize: by allowing for the possibility that different value be placed upon things coincident in all natural features, we would disconnect moral value from the features relevant to practical decision-making. But this, if I understand it, has no force at all. A good comedian can plan and modify his act without reliance upon any supervenience; likewise the enhancement of value would be practicable only provided our moral responses were to a sufficient extent *foreseeable*—which is much less than is demanded by the conceptual connection between the natural and the moral embodied in supervenience.

There are problems with (b) as well. One quite natural response to a demonstration of supervenience would be to treat it as showing that moral qualities admit of an odd kind of *variable realization*: that while there are no particular natural qualities which, a priori, they are constrained to be, they are constrained to be whatever natural qualities they turn out, a posteriori, to be. This might ultimately be an incoherent response, but it is not a non-starter; and it is not clear why whatever proves to be the best explanation of supervenience available to projectivism should not be available to a proponent of it. Since the position holds to the reality of moral qualities, there is no evident way that consideration of supervenience can issue in support for any form of anti-realism until this form of naturalism is disposed of.

Blackburn's account of supervenience is in any case unhappy in ways whose repair may not be a trivial undertaking. According to it, ψ is going to turn out to supervene on ϕ in any case where both are properties of a single individual who is necessarily the only ϕ if anything is ϕ. So absolutely every characteristic of myself is going to supervene upon my exact place and date of birth, for instance, or my exact present location, or on any characteristic which may be expressed by a definite description which I satisfy. Plainly, the intention of Blackburn's account is something more refined than this, and it is the refinement which may be relevant (or not) to questions concerning realism and projectivism. But how should the refinement proceed? So long as it allowed that ϕ may be a necessarily uniquely instantiated property, it is unclear how to move. But if we stipulate that ϕ must be capable of multiple instantiation, we risk squeezing out an important class of serious supervenience claims. Consider the example of aesthetic value. There is, I take it, a prima facie appeal in the idea that at least certain sorts of aesthetic appraisal are, like morals but unlike humour, *principled*; if so, at least some aesthetic qualities will supervene upon non-aesthetic ones. So ask: are considerations of *origin* ever to be relevant to the appraisal of these qualities? Presumably so;

otherwise a forgery would be comparable to the performance of a symphony. So if we were to refine Blackburn's account of supervenience in this obvious way, the price of maintaining the supervenience of aesthetic quality upon natural features would be that we should have abrogated the means to explain the distinctive value of an original over a copy. If, on the other hand, we leave the account unrefined, the relation between the distinguishing original features of a work of art and its value is so far undifferentiated from the relation between my present location and the fact that I am wearing no tie.[5]

The intuitive conception of supervenience is merely that differences in the supervening qualities must be reflected in differences in the qualities supervened upon. That is not what Blackburn's account says, *prima facie* at least. Are the difficulties in Blackburn's account the result, perhaps, of a misformulation? It would not appear so. Where ψ, as before, supervenes upon ϕ, the intuitive notion would come to

Nec. $[(\chi)(\gamma)(\psi\chi \wedge -\psi\gamma \rightarrow -(\phi\chi \wedge \phi\gamma)]$

whose equivalence with Blackburn's account is very easily shown. It would seem fair to conclude not merely that it is unclear how projectivist claims can be supported by considerations of supervenience relations but, more, that the intuitive idea of supervenience may itself be in poor condition; and that considerable refinement is wanted before much of philosophical interest can flow from the relation's obtaining in particular cases.

If the supervenience argument fails in the moral case, it would anyway not be applicable, as noted, in the paradigm case of humour, nor, so far as I can see, in any of the other areas—theoretical science and pure mathematics, for instance—where some form of non-factualism could seem attractive. But mere attractiveness, even if widely felt, is no argument, and it is not easy to glean how *in general* Blackburn believes projectivists should support their case. In particular, he forecloses on the most natural and promising line of support by his belief in the importance and desirability of success for quasi-realism. For the obvious way to try to give substance to a projectivist view would be to argue that the seeming statements of a certain genre did not in fact share sufficient of the distinctive features of the syntax and semantics of genuine statements to qualify for inclusion in that category. If the quasi-realist programme were successful for that particular genre, then this strategy would be pre-empted. Blackburn tends to write as though it would be a considerable coup for the projectivist to carry through the quasi-realist programme, since he would then have entitled himself to all the advantages of the realist mode of talk without the lumber of the unwelcome epistemological commitments, etc. But the blade cuts in both directions: the more success the quasi-realist programme enjoys, the harder it becomes for the projectivist to maintain the non-factual stance. If it really can be explained—and Blackburn takes imaginative strides towards doing so—how the moral projectivist can acknowledge the susceptibility of moral judgements to conditional and other forms of embedding, and even how we can have a worthwhile truth predicate for

[5] In 'Supervenience Revisited', Blackburn notes that difficulties are occasioned if ψ is only uniquely instantiable. But he there only has in mind the case where ψ is a *total* description of some sort, and I do not see that the response he proposes will cope with the present difficulty. But I cannot elaborate here.

them, then, so far from vindicating a form of moral anti-realism, why has it not been explained how the moral realist can, in effect, cut past the epistemological difficulties which beset non-naturalism without incurring any obligation to furnish reductions?

Blackburn comes close to acknowledging the force of this thought (pp. 219–20) but the resulting position is disappointing. It amounts, in effect, to the admission that once it has been explained how the language of some region of discourse may take on all the features of paradigm statement-making, we might as well allow that we therein deal with genuine statements. And this is just to turn our back on the programme of explicating the intuitions of the scientific instrumentalists and those who have doubted the factuality of pure mathematics, e.g., who were never under any illusion that in those areas we in all respects talk *as if* there were corresponding facts.

In chapter 7, however, there is a hint of what I think is a more promising line. Blackburn introduces (p. 244) the idea of what he calls a *correspondence conditional*, a conditional of the form

> if I form only beliefs with a proper pedigree, and end up believing that P, then it is true that P.

Blackburn's point in context is that such conditionals ought in general to be acceptable but not trivially so, that the relation between implementation of our best methods of inquiry and securing the truth is always one of fallibility; and that coherence accounts of truth are hard-pressed to make of such conditionals anything but tautologies. However that may be, it will also be a reasonable constraint on the quasi-realist programme for a particular class of apparent statements that such conditionals involving them turn out to be, by and large, acceptable. Meeting this constraint will require an account of why aiming at 'proper pedigree' is likely to produce truth—in whatever sense the quasi-realist has earned. Might it not turn out that the original intuitions of the scientific instrumentalists, moral projectivists, and the rest are reflected either in the inability of the quasi-realist to deliver anything but a trivial account of the relation—cf. Blackburn's charge against the coherence conception of truth—or in the account's taking a quite different form to that assumed in paradigm cases of factuality? Blackburn is aware of the possibility of this line of inquiry (pp. 256–7) but does not seem enthusiastic about it. I would judge it well worth pursuing.

The fact is that the *complete* success of the quasi-realist programme could in the end be nothing but a source of embarrassment for the projectivist. This is from p. 211, after Blackburn has sketched a projectivist interpretation of Hume on causation:

> Since this is the basic structure of Hume's theory, it follows that he has been shamefully abused by many commentators and their victims. He is not denying that there exist causes; he is not inconsistent when he says that there exist unknown causes of things; he is not concerned to say that causal propositions can be analysed into ones about the regular successions of events, which then capture their entire content. He is merely explaining our normal sayings, our normal operations with the concept, in terms of the reactions we have, after exposure to a reality which exhibits no such feature.

So Hume is not denying that there are causes, but merely explaining our causal talk in terms of reactions which we have to a reality which contains no causes!

The infelicity is not accidental: how is Blackburn, or Hume, to express his belief in the non-factuality of causes if *everything* which we normally say can be legitimated along quasi-realist lines? We normally talk exactly as if there are causes! The difficulty runs right through Blackburn's discussion. How, if quasi-realism is successful, is the projectivist to express what he wants to deny? Once the quasi-realist has earned himself the right to a truth predicate, must not the projectivist sulk in silence unless he can *somehow* distinguish that predicate from the one which is characteristic of genuinely factual statements? The moral, I suggest, is that the very coherence of a projectivist viewpoint requires some limitation on the quasi-realist's success, some failure of analogy, whether in the account of Blackburn's correspondence conditionals or elsewhere. If this is right, then Blackburn's belief that the attractions of projectivism are enhanced in proportion to the success of quasi-realism is mistaken, and his enthusiasm for projectivist projects concerning morals and modality sits ill alongside the disclaimer of p. 257. Moreover, since it will be within the province of the philosophy of language, *in the broadest sense of the term, to uncover the limitations of any* particular quasi-realist project, part at least of what is at issue in this particular form of realist/anti-realist debate must remain an issue for this part of philosophy.

The notes which conclude each of Blackburn's chapters contain a very brief bibliography of readings on the main issues discussed. The selection is, by and large, judicious, and the keen student who has followed the detail of Blackburn's chapter should not experience too much difficulty in following up the additional material for himself. A seminar held last summer suggests that, while not making it much easier, Blackburn's book does make the philosophy of language interesting and fun. Students who work through it diligently will derive a lot: they will gain a good grasp of a number of central issues, a sense of the importance and place of the philosophy of language—of why it so much as exists—and an excellent example of what it is like to do it well.

University of St. Andrews, Scotland CRISPIN WRIGHT

Hegel. By M.J. Inwood. Henley-on-Thames: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984. Pp. xv + 582. £24.00.

The re-awakening of interest in Hegel in English-speaking philosophical circles began some fifteen years ago. It arose in an atmosphere of dissatisfaction with the current orthodoxies, fired by the hope that it would do something to lift us out of ourselves and enlarge our philosophical perspectives. Some such change has, I believe, taken place, though how far this was an outcome of the study of Hegel is another question. It has to be said that some of the writers of the seventies counteracted their own intended effect by over-hastily forcing twentieth-century (especially Wittgensteinian) doctrines and arguments onto Hegel's text, so seeming to provide yet more buttressing—if from an unexpected quarter—for philosophical practice as it then was. That mistake Inwood, in this new publication on Hegel, wholly avoids. He comes to Hegel from as neutral a philosophical standpoint as I can imagine, given that he is committed to the use of what are, in the widest sense, analytical techniques. His approach, though not the detail of his style,