Review Article

WHAT THE LIAR REALLY SAYS*

Cargile's book is not, contrary to what its title might lead one to expect, a sustained treatment of paradoxes. The first three-quarters is given over to topics in the philosophy of language: subject-predicate form, Mill on names, universals and Meinongian 'subsistents', connotation and denotation, and the nature of assertion and predication. It is only towards the end of his discussion of the last of these topics that Cargile arrives at certain theses which he is able to work into a novel analysis of the Liar and various close relations, to which the last quarter of the book is devoted.

The book makes large demands of the reader. Most of it will certainly be inaccessible to average, and better than average, philosophy under-graduates. Large parts of it read like an interim research report in note form. Cargile seems to have presupposed a readership which has thought just as hard about these issues as he has: little is included by way of signposting or recapitulation, important conclusions are scarcely distinguished from casual asides, and much of the discussion is fragmented and 'pointilistic' rather than sequential, so that hard work and great patience are needed to keep track. But the effort, on balance, is worth it. Cargile has lots of interesting ideas to air and, even where his conclusions seem unwarranted, the perspective in which his discussion places a problem is often fruitful.

A typical example is a little argument which occurs in the Chapter, *Denotation and Connotation*. Frege held, as is familiar, that 'Caesar', as it occurs in (*i*): 'Bill believes that Caesar is dead', stands not for the celebrated conqueror of Gaul but for its own customary sense. But (*i*) is equivalent to (*ii*): 'Bill believes the proposition that Caesar is dead'; and (*iii*): 'Caesar is dead' is equivalent to (*iv*): 'The proposition that Caesar is dead is true'. So presumably, reasons Cargile, the occurrence of 'Caesar' in (*ii*) has a different reference to that of its occurrence in (*iv*); and how is that to be reconciled with possession of the *same* reference by the respective occur-rences of 'the proposition that Caesar is dead' in (*ii*) and (*iv*)?—Which is surely prerequisite if we are to sustain the inference from (*ii*) and (*iv*) to (*v*): 'Bill believes something true'.

How could saying of the proposition that Caesar is dead that it is believed by Bill change the reference of a component term in a description denoting that proposition over the reference we would have if we had said of the proposition, not that it was believed by Bill, but that it was true? (p. 176).

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* Review of James Cargile [1979]: *Paradoxes, A Study in Form and Predication*. Cambridge University Press. £12.50. Pp. xvii + 308.

It would be premature to suggest that this is a consideration which destroys Frege's account of the semantics of indirect discourse. But since the validity of the inference from (*ii*) and (*iv*) to (*v*) is intelligible only if the occurrences, in the premises, of 'the proposition that Caesar is dead' co-refer, and since their co-reference is intelligible only if their respective occurrences of 'Caesar' co-refer (indeed, arguably, only if those occurrences have the same sense), the Fregean view has to be that the 'Caesar' in (*iv*) does *not* co-refer with the 'Caesar' in (*iii*), contrary to Cargile's presupposition. So although Cargile's objection is not well taken as it stands, the Fregean is left owing an account of how it is that these two occurrences of 'Caesar' fail to co-refer despite the fact that any expression substitutable *salva veritate* for the occurrence of 'Caesar' in (*iii*) will likewise be so substitutable for the occurrence of Caesar in (*iv*). (The topic is discussed in Blackburn and Code [1977a]. See also Blackburn and Code [1977b] and Geach [1977]; and Dummett [1981].) There are similarly provocative short asides on the asymmetry of subject and predicate with respect to negation (pp. 164–8), on vagueness (pp. 108–9), and on many other topics.

Cargile's discussion of the paradoxes centres upon the following *prima facie* cumbersome version of the Liar (henceforward, the *Cargile Liar*),

A is to be the sentence, '*A* is not true'. Now assume
(1) Any sentence is true if and only if what it says is true; and
(2) What *A* says is that *A* is not true. Then given that
(3) That *P* is true if and only if *P*,

holds good for the substitution of any significant declarative sentence in place of *P*, we may reason

(*a*) *A* is true if and only if what it says is true; [by 1]
(*b*) *A* is true if and only if that *A* is not true, is true; [by *a* and 2]
(*c*) *A* is true if and only if *A* is not true; [by *b* and 3, assuming that 2 yields that *A* is a significant declarative sentence].

So 1, 2, and 3 generate a contradiction; which is paradoxical since they are each antecedently plausible. At any rate, we now have a responsibility to explain precisely what is wrong with {1, 2, 3}.

Why has Cargile chosen to concentrate upon this version of the Liar rather than the more familiar *Tarski Liar*, flowing from the scheme:
(*T*) where *P* is any significant declarative sentence, and '*S*' is any name of *P*: *S* is true if and only if *P*.
Hence, since '*A*' is a name of '*A* is not true', and assuming that the latter is a significant declarative sentence, we get directly to
A is true if and only if *A* is not true.

Cargile doesn't explain, but there is an apparent point to the additional complexity of his formulation. For given a suitable generalisation of (2), say
(2*) where *S* and *P* are related as in *T*: what *S* says is that *P*,

T follows straightforwardly from 1, 2* and 3. So that response to this more familiar version of the Liar which holds that the *T*-scheme is not unrestrictedly acceptable owes in addition an explanation of what is amiss with {1, 2*, 3} in any case. Cargile's version has the arguable merit that it makes the role of those assumptions explicit.

In Cargile's view, it is 2 (or, more generally, 2*) that is the culprit: semantic paradoxes typically arise from natural but mistaken assumptions about what certain sentences say or about what certain predicates predicate (p. 227, and ch. 7 passim). So far, that is an unoriginal suggestion. Ryle, and Russell, for example, would have agreed, from their differing standpoints, that *A* makes no statement at all, so that 2 is false *a fortiori*. But what is novel about Cargile's attitude to *A* in particular is the suggestion that 2 is an *incomplete* account of what *A* says. If this is correct, the step from *a* to *b* in the paradoxical reasoning fails: that it is necessary and sufficient for the truth of *A* that what it says be true does not entail that ⌜that *A* is not true⌝ is so necessary and sufficient unless the cornered sentence expresses precisely what *A* says. So the paradox is blocked.

Cargile's dissatisfaction with 2 as an account of the content of *A* stems from certain conclusions concerning the nature of assertion and predication at which he arrives in chapter 6 (see especially sections 78–9). Not implausibly

I. To assert/deny a sentence, or proposition, is to predicate truth/falsity of it.

But *I* comes to seem less plausible when it becomes clear that Cargile intends it as an *identity* (see *e.g.* p. 222), so that an Englishman who uncomprehendingly asserts that 'la neige est blanche' is true has made the very same assertion as a Frenchman who asserts the quoted sentence. In any case *I* needs to be understood in conjunction with some fairly *outré* doctrines concerning predication. For Cargile, as for anyone else, the basic mode of predication is the subject-predicate sentence: one who asserts 'Socrates is mortal' predicates mortality of Socrates. But Cargile also holds, if I extrapolate correctly from his text,

II (a) To assert all *F*'s are *G* is to predicate *G* of each thing which is *F* (p. 218); and

II (b) To assert the conditional, if *P* then *Fa*, is to predicate *F* of *a* if it so happens that *P* is true (p. 220);

II (c) Russell has the right account of subject-predicate sentences, i.e. such sentences present some condition as uniquely satisfied and effect a predication on whatever, if anything, uniquely satisfies it.

Put these in conjunction with

III To assert a statement is to assert all of its logical consequences, and

IV The content of a declarative sentence—what it says—is given by the totality of assertions which someone who asserts it thereby makes

and it is clear that we are in the market for some highly unorthodox accounts of assertoric content. In particular, since any conditional statement 'if P, then Q' is equivalent to 'if P, then it is true that Q', the assertoric content of a conditional always includes its consequent if it so happens that the antecedent is true (I and IIb). Likewise someone who asserts 'everything Thatcher says is true' thereby asserts everything which Thatcher asserts (I and IIa), even if he knows little about the detail of Thatcher's assertions.

These are strange-seeming views, nor have I found it easy to locate much in the way of positive argument for them in Cargile's book. (Of course, a 'solution' to the paradoxes can't constitute such an argument: we do not have a solution until we have independent grounds for the inadmissibility of a type of premise involved.) But it is not straightforward to say why Cargile's generalisation of the notion of assertoric content seems so unattractive. Certain queries arise: are we, for example, somehow to understand the antecedent of a conditional of the form, 'if it is true that P, then Q', as a hypothetical assertion of P—and if so, how does that conditional's content differ, as it ought, from that of 'if it is asserted that P, then Q'? Further, how can assertion be a proper indicator of belief unless the assertor can be presumed cognisant of the content of what he asserts? However, it is not clear that Cargile has no satisfactory responses to such queries. On page 223, for example, he makes what he considers to be a vital distinction between the *assessable* and *non-assessable* content of an assertion: in effect, if I understand it, that Q is a non-assessable part of the assertion of P if and only if P and Q are not logically equivalent and the assertion of P involves the assertion of Q for reasons to do with I–IV. Presumably, then, Cargile would respond to the second query by insisting that it is the *assessable* content of an assertion which is the indicator of belief. I do not know how he would respond to the first.

What, then, is wrong with premise 2 in the Cargile Liar? Simply that, given I and IV, the predication of truth of A has to be reckoned to be part of the content of A. But in that case both 'A is not true' *and* 'A is true' are part of the content of A; so A is contradictory and hence, stably and unparadoxically, false. A is a contradiction, distinguished from run-of-the-mill explicit contradictions only by the circumstance that in order to bring its contradictoriness into view, it is necessary to have recourse to Cargile's theory of assertoric content.

Suppose that for 2 we substitute, what Cargile would find acceptable

(2′) Part of what A says is that A is not true

In that case line b becomes

b′) A is true only if that A is not true, is true; [by a and 2′]

So c′) A is true only if A is not true; [by b′ and 3]
So d′) A is not true; [c′].
But that is as far as we can go. Since d′ does not exhaust the content of A,

there is no running on to '*A* is true'; *d'* stands as a theorem, telling us the correct assessment of the truth-status of *A*. Of course, since *d'* is part of what *A* says, *A* is partly true; but that, classically at least, is a feature of any contradiction.

Let us attempt to apply Cargile's machinery to a couple of other paradoxes of the same ilk about which he is less explicit. First consider Epimenides the Cretan, who asserts the declarative sentence *C*:

'No declarative sentence asserted by a Cretan is true.'

Formulating the resulting paradox in the manner of the Cargile Liar, we have:

i	(*i*)	*C* is true; [Ass.]
i, 1	(*ii*)	What *C* says is true; [*i*, by 1]
iii	(*iii*)	What *C* says is that no declarative sentence asserted by a Cretan is true; [Ass.]
i, 1, *iii*	(*iv*)	That no declarative sentence asserted by a Cretan is true, is true; [*ii*, *iii*]
i, 1, *iii*, 3	(*v*)	No declarative sentence asserted by a Cretan is true; [*iv*, 3]
vi	(*vi*)	*C* is asserted by a Cretan; [Ass.]
i, 1, *iii*, 3, *vi*	(*vii*)	*C* is not true; [*v*, *vi*]
1, *iii*, 3, *vi*	(*viii*)	*C* is true → *C* is not true; [*i*, *viii*, Conditional Proof]
1, *iii*, 3, *vi*	(*ix*)	*C* is not true; [*viii*]
1, *iii*, 3, *vi*	(*x*)	What *C* says is not true; [*ix*, 1]
1, *iii*, 3, *vi*	(*xi*)	It is not true that no declarative sentence asserted by a Cretan is true; [*iii*, *x*]
1, *iii*, 3, *vi*	(*xii*)	Some declarative sentence asserted by a Cretan is true; [*xi*, Classical Logic]

So, given only the principles 1 and 3, the contingent truth *vi*, and a plausible presupposition about the content of C, *viz. iii*, we have the result, acceptable in itself but unacceptable when obtained in this way, that Epimenides or some other Cretan told the truth on some other occasion. For Cargile, however, *iii* will be false, because contradictory; for on the one hand, by *I*, it predicates truth of itself, but on the other hand, by *II* (a) and given *vi*, it predicates falsity of itself. To be sure, *iii* is correct as a formulation of *part* of what *C* says; but the corresponding weaker premise will only subserve the inference as far as line *x*, which then stands as an unparadoxical assessment of Epimenides' contradictory remark. (*Cf.* Cargile, pp. 290 and 296.)

Next, let us review the status of the Curry Paradox which pivots on such a sentence as:

H: 'If *H* is true, then the moon is made of green cheese.'

We proceed:

i	(*i*)	*H* is true; [Ass.]
i, 1	(*ii*)	What *H* says is true; [*i*, 1]
iii	(*iii*)	What *H* says is that if *H* is true, then the moon is made of green cheese; [Ass.]
i, 1, *iii*	(*iv*)	That if *H* is true, then the moon is made of green cheese, is true; [*ii*, *iii*]
i, 1, *iii*, 3	(*v*)	If *H* is true, then the moon is made of green cheese; [*iv*, 3]
i, 1, *iii*, 3	(*vi*)	The moon is made of green cheese; [*i*, *v*, MPP]
1, *iii*, 3	(*vii*)	If *H* is true, then the moon is made of green cheese; [*i*, *vi*, Conditional Proof]
1, *iii*, 3	(*viii*)	That if *H* is true, then the moon is made of green cheese, is true; [*vii*, 3]
1, *iii*, 3	(*ix*)	What *H* says is true; [*iii*, *viii*]
1, *iii*, 3	(*x*)	*H* is true; [*ix*, 1]
1, *iii*, 3	(*xi*)	The moon is made of green cheese; [*vii*, *x*, MPP]

But *iii*, however plausible, will not be acceptable to Cargile as a statement of the content of *H*. The explanation is simple: by *I*, *H* predicates truth of itself; hence, since *iii* is at least correct as a statement of part of *H*'s content, this content also includes, by *III* and *IV*, the statement that the moon is made of green cheese—which *iii* leaves quite out of account. (*Cf.* Cargile, pp. 289 and 296.) Since *iii* is false, there is nothing paradoxical about line *xi* and the correct but weaker:

> (*iii'*) Part of what *H* says is that if *H* is true, then the moon is made of green cheese

will subserve the inference as far as line *viii* but no further.

At this point it looks as though Cargile might well have a technically adequate way with these paradoxes, and that the crucial question will concern its philosophical pedigree. On closer inspection, however, matters come to seem less straightforward. Consider the following example, to which Cargile gives a substantial amount of attention:

B: 'It is not the case that what Bill, on first reading, takes *B* to say is true'

Suppose we get Bill to read *B*, and suppose that

i	(*i*)	It is not the case that what Bill, on first reading, takes *B* to say is true; [Ass.] Suppose also:
ii	(*ii*)	What Bill, on first reading, takes *B* to say is that it is not the case that what Bill, on first reading, takes *B* to say is true; [Ass.] Then, substituting, we have:

| *i, ii* | (*iii*) | It is not the case that: that it is not the case that what Bill, on first reading, takes B to say is true, is true. |

Applying 3 to everything following the first occurrence of 'it is not the case that', we have

| 3, *i, ii* | (*iv*) | It is not the case that it is not the case that what Bill, on first reading, takes B to say is true. |

But this is inconsistent with *i*; hence $\{3, ii\} \vdash \sim i$. That is,

| 3, *ii* | (*v*) | It is not the case that it is not the case that what Bill, on first reading, takes B to say is true. |

Eliminating the double negative, we have

| 3, *ii* | (*vi*) | What Bill, on first reading, takes B to say is true. |

Thus

| 3, *ii* | (*vii*) | That it is not the case that what Bill, on first reading takes B to say is true, is true; [from *vi* and *ii*] |
| 3, ii | (*viii*) | It is not the case that what Bill, on first reading, takes B to say is true [*vii* and 3] |

But *vi* and *viii* are inconsistent; hence $3 \vdash \sim ii$.

What is notable in this example is that no play with 1 or 2* is involved. Given only 3, we seem to have shown that Bill, even on first reading, cannot take B at face value; hence if 3 is acceptable *a priori*, so is that constraint on Bill. And that is extremely odd: for if there is such a thing as the proposition that it is not the case that what Bill, on first reading, takes B to say is true, why cannot Bill, on first reading, take B to say precisely that?

One answer would simply draw attention to the foregoing derivation. But that is scarcely satisfactory. Rather, we need to be persuaded that *ii* really is necessarily false if the derivation is not to rank as paradoxical. Can Cargile oblige? Well, he believes he can (p. 283) in terms of his theory of predication. If Bill claims that *ii* is correct, then, according to Cargile,

... he merely exhibits a conceptual confusion and does not identify any proposition at all, not even one B does not express, and so does not connect B with any proposition, even mistakenly. According to Bill, B predicates non-truth of what he takes B to say, where that predication is what he takes B to say. But then Bill ought to have said that B predicates non-truth of that predicating. That is, he ought equally well to have said this, but it won't do either. Bill's utterance, though sincere, would be nonsense (p. 286).

That is, if Bill, knowing that it refers to himself, offers 'that it is not the case that what Bill, on first reading, takes B to say is true' as an explanation of what Bill, on first reading, takes B to say, he purports both to identify his

first-reading interpretation of B and to have recognised, on first reading, that B says that the proposition thereby identified is not true . . .

And this performance . . . comes to nothing. If the report of what is said were right, the report of what is said about it would have to be wrong, and conversely, if the report of what is said about what is allegedly said were right, then the report of what is said must be wrong. Thus Bill's attempt to report what is said would be a failure to report anything (p. 287).

But Cargile's thought here is extremely hard to follow. He seems to be taking it as evident that if Bill is to identify a particular proposition, say P, as the content of a sentence, he has to do better than say something which could equally be taken to claim that what the sentence says is that P is not true. That, to be sure, is a plausible enough assumption. But it is quite unclear how Cargile can be in a position to make it, for the essence of his response to the Liar was precisely to allow that

   A says that what it says is true, and
   A says that that what it says is true, is not true,

are *both* part of the content of A. If Cargile's theory is coherent, it can hardly be an objection to the coherence of Bill's presentation of *ii* as an account of his first reading interpretation of B that the sentence is represented both as effecting a certain predication and as 'predicating non-truth of that predicating'. Not that I wish to deny that *ii* does fail to report any determinate interpretation of B: the question is whether Cargile can give the right reasons for saying so.

   Paradoxes flowing from premises containing none of the progeny of 2^* will evidently threaten trouble for Cargile's thesis that it is false assumptions about what sentences say which are at the root of these difficulties. What then ought his response to be to the *Propositional Liar*?:

   Let 'A' stand for the proposition that A is not true, and suppose

i	(*i*)	A is true; [Ass.] Then
i	(*ii*)	That A is not true, is true; [i, def. 'A']
i, 3	(*iii*)	A is not true; [*ii*. by 3]
3	(*iv*)	A is true $\rightarrow A$ is not true; [i. *iii*, Conditional Proof]
3	(*v*)	A is not true; [*iv*]
3	(*vi*)	That A is not true, is true; [*v*, by 3]
3	(*vii*)	A is true; [*vi*, def. 'A']
	(*viii*)	~ 3; [*v*, *vii*]

Prima facie, Cargile has no option but to let the result stand and contrive to attribute the falsity of 3 to that of 2^*. And, to be sure, 3 is derivable from 2^*, in the presence of T and 1. But since T is already placed under suspicion by

the Tarski Liar, it now comes to seem unclear how 2*, or its applications, may legitimately be seen as the *source* of these paradoxes; *i.e.*, as independently recognisably false principles whose rejection will block the paradoxes' derivation. If Cargile's views about assertion and predication are correct, then indeed 2* is false—assuming that the paradoxical sentences may be regarded as significant declarative sentences. But it would be reasonable to regard the falsity of 2* as the explanation (whatever the sense of that notion in this context) of the falsity of 3 only if the former entails the latter in conjunction with premises all of which are uncontroversially acceptable. That does not appear to be the position; nor, conversely, does rejection of 2* entail rejection of 3. So it really is quite unclear what Cargile's theory has to say about the Propositional Liar; and consequently unclear whether it is defensible to believe that mistakes about assertoric content and predication are fundamental to these paradoxes.

   Rejection of 3, is, in any case, very hard to stomach: for it is merely an expression of the principle that any genuine proposition states a condition necessary and sufficient for its own truth, and that principle seems absolutely constitutive of the notions of proposition and truth. The right thought about the Propositional Liar is rather, surely, that its initial stipulation fails to specify any referent for 'A'—that there is, in this context, no such proposition as the proposition that A is not true. The thought could be motivated in several ways. But a very natural way of arriving at it would be to adapt Cargile's own treatment (pp. 297–9) of the Heterological paradox. A predicate, F, is heterological if and only if there is some property Φ which it expresses and which doesn't apply to it; *i.e.*

$$\text{Het }(F) \leftrightarrow (\exists \Phi)(\text{Exp }(F, \Phi) \mathbin{\&} \sim \Phi F)$$

Now the existential, 'something is G', is equivalent to 'everything is such that if everything other than it is not G, then it is G'. Accordingly, to claim that F is heterological is to claim: every property, Φ, is such that if every property other than it is either not expressed by F or applies to F, then Φ is expressed by F and fails to apply to F. Hence, by Cargile's *II* (a) cited earlier, whenever F expresses one and only one property, to predicate heterologicality of F will be to assert that the consequent of that universal conditional holds of that property. Consequently to claim that both 'verb' and 'preposition', *e.g.*, are heterological is not, on Cargile's account, to predicate one and the same property of both. The above definition of 'Het' is to be seen not as defining a property but rather as stipulating how to recover what (variable) predication is effected by 'heterological' in a particular context. And since this varies, there is no uniform property expressed by 'heterological' of which we can ask whether or not it applies to 'heterological'. So the paradox is preempted. But now, since Cargile holds that predication of truth/untruth of a sentence (or proposition) is simply tantamount to assertion/denial of that sentence (or proposition), a similar view would seem

to be suggested of 'is true' and 'is not true' and their synonyms; *viz.* that there is no uniform property expressed by *e.g.* 'is not true', that the content of predicating untruth of a sentence (or proposition) has to be recovered by reference to what that sentence is used to say (or the identity of the proposition concerned). Accordingly, unless some account of the latter is possible without explicit recourse to the notion of truth, there simply is no determinate content to such a predication. If 'is true' and its kin borrow their content from the identity of what they are predicated of, the last word on the latter cannot coherently be supposed unavoidably to involve their use—if it does, the putative subject of the predication will not be explicable without circularity; so there will be no subject.

Such an approach would cope smoothly with the paradox of what Bill, on first reading, takes B to say: premise *ii* in the development of that paradox does indeed fail to report any proposition which Bill, on first reading, takes B to say since there is no way of recovering the content of the play which it makes with 'is not true' so as to subserve the principle just adumbrated. Hence, if *ii* is all there is to say about what Bill on first reading takes B to say, then there is no proposition which Bill on first reading takes B to say—and *ii* is false in virtue of implying the contrary. Elsewhere, in cases where 2* or applications of it are involved, the approach will concur with Cargile in rejecting such premises; but the basis for the rejection will be not, as for Cargile, that they are incomplete as accounts of the content of the relevant sentences but that those sentences have no propositional content.

As remarked, Cargile's own ideas on predication and assertion suggest such an approach. But other views on truth would motivate a similar line. Strawson's 'performatory' theory, for example, would directly enjoin that the content, if any, of a declarative sentence in which the primary predication is of truth or untruth must be explicable by reference to that of an assertion in which no explicit play with truth or untruth is made. (See Strawson [1949].) Cargile discusses Strawson's view in §90, pages 267–79. (Strawson, for his part, notes the possibility of turning Cargile's ideas in this, for him, more congenial direction in his [1981].) And Kripke's recent proposal on the paradoxes [1975] is founded on the intuition—if I read him correctly—that a declarative sentence should be regarded as expressive of a (determinately true or false) proposition only if the application to it of one of the predicates, 'true' and 'false', could in principle be justified by reference to (A) justified assertions not explicitly involving the notions of truth and falsity, (B) ordinary predicate logic, and (C) the principle that we are entitled to assert that any particular sentence is true/false in and only in circumstances in which we are entitled to assert/deny that sentence itself. Thus there is, trivially, no objection to regarding the Policeman's 'Everything in the Witness' testimony is false' as expressing a determinate (true) proposition if it so happens that the Witness' testimony consists of three assertions, P, Q, and R, each of whose formulation is free of 'true' and its kin and each of which we are entitled to deny; the steps are

P is false; (C)
Q is false; (C)
R is false; (C)

$\{P, Q, R,\}$ constitute everything in the Witness' testimony; (A)
_____
Everything in the Witness' testimony is false; (B)

But if it so happens that the Witness' testimony is constituted by 'What the Policeman alleges is true', there is no mode of deployment of (A), (B) and (C) which could lead to a non-arbitrary assignment of truth-value to either; so, according to the intuition, no determinate proposition is being expressed. The same applies to the form of words which Bill uses to report the putative proposition which, on first reading, he takes B to express.

Kripke does not offer a great deal by way of philosophical motivation for this intuition, concentrating instead upon the exegesis of a formal theory of truth adequate to reflect it. But in outline at least the motivation is clear enough: a sentence should be regarded as expressing a determinate proposition only if associated with determinate truth-conditions, and may be regarded as so associated only if we can explain what it would be, at least in principle, to be justified in claiming that these conditions are, or are not, realised—*i.e.* that the sentence is, or is not, true. But such justification, it appears, wherever it is not afforded by a simple application of principle (C), can ultimately be yielded, if at all, only by the sort of combined application of (A), (B) and (C) illustrated.

Much work is needed if this line of thought is to be fully explicated and assessed. That Cargile did not choose to trouble to do some of this work is, in view of the affinity with at least one strand in his own thinking, surprising and disappointing. (Actually, nothing in Cargile's list of references post-dates 1975.) Undoubtedly, Cargile has a novel approach to the paradoxes; though because of the relative unclarity of the philosophical bases of his views concerning assertion and predication, and its apparent inapplicability to certain forms of the Liar and its kin, his approach does not strike me, at least in his present exposition, as persuasive. Perhaps it would have been better had he presented his treatment of the paradoxes, along with those sections which prepare the ground for it, in a separate monograph treating also of other recent approaches. As it is, there is a danger that the contribution which Cargile's book makes to the topic will be less widely absorbed than it deserves.

CRISPIN WRIGHT
University of St Andrews

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